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The Rights of the Living Dead: Absent Persons in the
Civil Law
Jeanne Louise Carriere*
INTRODUCTION: THE NEED FOR A REGIME OF ABSENT PERSONS
In common parlance, the word "absent" is used to describe one
who is not where he is supposed to be. A professor who does not attend
a faculty meeting, a student who misses class, and a soldier who has
left base without authorization are all absent in the ordinary sense of
the term. Legal theory and legislation employ the word in a narrower
sense.' One who is absent is not at his legal domicile, but he is not
just away from home. He has left no clue to his whereabouts, and it
is impossible to ascertain whether he is alive or dead. If he could be
located anywhere, he would not be absent; nor would he be so if the
circumstances of his disappearance could meet the level of persuasion
required to prove that he was dead. 2 Planiol points to this uncertainty
© Copyright 1990, by LouISIANA LAW REVIEW.
* Associate Professor, Tulane University School of Law. B.A., St. Mary's Do-
minican College; M.A., Ph.D., University of California at Los Angeles; J.D., Tulane
University School of Law. I would like to express my gratitude to Professors A.N.
Yiannopoulos, Cynthia Samuel, Thomas Carbonneau, Katherine Spaht, and Kathryn Lorio
for their helpful comments and criticisms.
1. Black's Law Dictionary 8 (5th ed. 1979) does not attribute a special technical
meaning to the word in common law, despite its creation, through the presumption of
death, of rules governing absence. But see Jalet, Mysterious Disappearance: The Pre-
sumption of Death and the Administration of the Estates of Missing Persons or Absentees,
54 Iowa L. Rev. 177 passim (1968) for the use of the words "absence," "absent," and
"absentee" in the technical sense. For similar usage in legislation, see La. Civ. Code
arts. 47-85.
2. Both the civil and the common law have long accepted proof of death from
circumstantial evidence; see, e.g., Boyd v. New England Life Ins. Co., 34 La. Ann. 848,
849 (1882) (holding that death of insured was proved by his disappearance from vessel
in the Gulf of Mexico, because "death, like all other facts, may be established by
circumstantial evidence"); C. Civ. art. 88 (France):
The death of any French person who has disappeared in France or outside of
France in circumstances of a nature to put his life in danger, when his body
has not been able to be found, may be judicially declared at the request of
the public prosecutor or of interested parties.
Under the same conditions, the death of any foreigner or stateless person who
disappears, either in a territory under French authority, or on board a French
vessel or aircraft, or abroad, may be judicially declared if he had his domicile
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as the hallmark of the absentee:3 "According to an expression of Tron-
chet, and as extraordinary as it may seem, the absentee 'is neither dead
nor alive'; in this uncertainty, it cannot be. proven that he is dead nor
that he is alive. It is, thus, doubt which ever prevails." 4
The number of these "living dead" in the United States has been
estimated at between 60,000 and 100,000.1 They create a morass of legal
problems. Questions may arise concerning the security of transactions
with the missing person's estate, such as the disposition of his land, 6
the right to proceeds of insurance policies on his life7 and pensions,'
or habitual residence in France..
The procedure for the judicial declaration of death is equally applicable when
death is certain but the body has not been able to be found.
In common law jurisdictions, disappearance of an individual in circumstances of special
peril enables a party to prove the death of the person who vanished without having to
rely on the presumption of death based on absence. See, e.g., Davie v. Briggs, 97 U.S.
628, 636 (1878) (death of individual who vanished while passing through hostile Indian
territory held to have occurred at that time); In re Frankel's Estate, 196 Misc. 268, 92
N.Y.S.2d 30 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1949) (death of Jewish Lithuanian life tenant of trust held
to have occurred during Nazi extermination of Jewish inhabitants of Lithuania, between
1941 and 1944).
3. In this article, "absentee," "missing person," and "person who has disappeared"
shall be used as synonyms for "absent person." "Absentee" has been used as the English
translation for the French absent in the Louisiana Civil Code; see La. Civ. Code arts.
47-85. It also appears in the translation of the French treatise of M. Planiol, Traite
elementaire de droit civil, passim (Louisiana State Law Institute trans. 12th ed. 1959).
Although, under the Greek Civil Code, an absentee may only be declared a "missing
person" by the court after a lapse of either one year if he disappeared "while his life
was in danger" or five years "since news of the absentee was last received," the systems
which will be examined in this article do not make such a distinction. See Greek Civ.
Code arts. 40-41 (Constantine Taliadoros trans. 1982). Napol6on himself applied "dis-
appearance" to situations in which, though no body could be recovered, death was certain;
see 1 M. Planiol, supra, § 612 (2), at 370; the present French system declares those who
vanish in such circumstances dead. See infra note 2. The terms are used interchangeably
in common law jurisdictions; see Jalet, supra note 1, passim.
4. 1 M. Planiol, supra note 3, § 634, at 379-80. See also his definition of "absentee,"
id. § 611, at 369.
5. The Federal Bureau of Investigation's computer file on missing persons at the
National Crime Information Center lists 60,000 reported cases of "regular Americans as
absent without logical explanation." The head of the private missing persons agency,
Search, Inc., estimates that 100,000 adult Americans are missing. Dean, Disappearing
Acts, Los Angeles Times, Sept. 19, 1989, § 5, at 1, col. 4.
6. See, e.g., Martin v. Phillips, 514 So. 2d 338, 341 (Miss. 1987) (detrimental reliance
on decree of death of absentee by vendees could prevent return of property on his
reappearance).
7. See, e.g., Lord v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 434 So. 2d 1180, 1182 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1983) (rejecting application of presumption of death to award of benefit under
life insurance policy).
8. See, e.g., Pierce v. Gervais, 425 So. 2d 922, 924-25 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1983)
(refusing to vacate judgment of divorce granted to spouse of soldier missing in Vietnam,
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the right to a cause of action,9 the necessity of providing for his
dependents, 10 the marital status of his spouse," the paternity and legit-
imacy of children of his spouse's second marriage, 2 the conservation
of his property from possible waste, 3 the devolution of succession rights
that would pass to him, 4 the release of property from a life tenancy,' 5
the requirement of his consent to certain transactions, 6 the merchant-
ability of land titles from his estate,' 7 and claims of inheritance from
him.'"
resulting in denial of military widow's benefits); 20 C.F.R. § 404.721(b) (1989) (governing
payment of social security survivors' benefits to spouses of absentees).
9. See, e.g., Ledet v. State Dept. of Health and Human Resources, 465 So. 2d 98,
101 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 468 So. 2d 1211 (1985) (plaintiff whose right of
action for wrongful death of sister depended on prior death of absentee mother could
rely on presumption of death based on absence).
10. See, e.g., Germain v. Germain, 31 Misc. 2d 401, 220 N.Y.S.2d 1013 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1961) (sequestering property and income of missing defendant, appointing spouse as
receiver to use them for her support).
11. See, e.g., Wells v. Wells, 79 N.J. Super. 388, 191 A.2d 763 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1963) (upholding validity of plaintiff's marriage to spouse missing for thirty-
three years, and finding second marriage eleven years after spouse disappeared was a
nullity); Stewart v. Rogers, 260 N.C. 475, 133 S.E.2d 155 (1963) (upholding validity of
second marriage, despite failure of absentee's spouse to wait statutory seven years, because
absentee disappeared in life-endangering circumstances); McCaffrey v. Benson, 38 La.
Ann. 198 (1886) (finding second marriage a nullity because of pre-existing, undissolved
marriage to person who had disappeared); La. Civ. Code art. 80 (repealed by 1938 La.
Acts No. 357) (authorizing remarriage of spouse of absentee).
12. See, e.g., Succession of Mitchell, 323 So. 2d 451, 456-57 (La. 1975) (children
legitimated by subsequent marriage of their biological parents, despite possibility that first
husband, an absentee, was alive at the time of their conception and birth).
13. For an enumeration of the steps which might be required to protect the absentee's
property, see Germain, 220 N.Y.S.2d at 1017.
14. See, e.g., Succession of Butler, 166 La. 224, 117 So. 127 (1928), on rehearing
(succession devolves exclusively on coheirs of absentee); Eagle v. Emmet, 4 Brad. 117
(N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1856) (legacy to absentee did not lapse prior to seven years of absence
because facts of disappearance did not suggest death).
15. See, e.g., Hanley v. Wadleigh, 88 N.H. 174, 186 A. 505 (1936) (life tenancy of
missing person not terminated by his absence, though remaindermen are entitled to damages
or forfeiture for his waste of the property).
16. See, e.g., Smith v. Wilson, 10 La. Ann. 255 (1855) (requiring absent co-owner's
express assent for him to be responsible for a share of the cost of substantial, but
unnecessary, improvements).
17. See, e.g., Saracino v. Kosower Const. Co., 102 N.J. Eq. 230, 140 A. 458 (1928)
(plaintiff's title to real property unmerchantable because absentee ancestor in title, though
presumed dead, might return).
18. See, e.g., Heirs of Wilson v. Smith, 14 La. Ann. 368 (1859) (denying succession
rights to real property of claimants who were unable to identify the absentee owner
thereof as the de cujus); Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Deal, 227 N.C. 691, 44 S.E.2d
73 (1947) (denying claim of collaterals to trust estate of absentee, who on the evidence
was neither presumed dead nor proven to be without descendants).
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The issues raised by absence thus range over many areas of sub-
stantive law. To explain the need for special rules to resolve them,
commentators sometimes refer to the rights of the absentee as uncertain.19
However, without a peculiar regime, the rights of the absentee should
remain constant, modified only by rules, such as acquisitive prescription,
that govern everyone. The principle that the burden of proof of any
change in the missing person's rights rests on the one seeking change
has been expressed as a presumption of continued life: one in existence
is presumed to continue in that state unless his death is proved. 20 Thus
the problems raised by his disappearance would be resolved as if he
were alive and present but chose to take no action. The results frequently
prove undesirable for the absent person, should he return, as well as
for others whose own rights are affected by his. For example, in Ped-
lahore v. Pedlahore, immovable property of the absentees was threatened
with seizure for unpaid paving fees. 2' The defendants in DeSena v.
Prudential Ins. Co. of America resisted paying insurance proceeds, owed
to an absent beneficiary, to the guardians of his indigent minor children
because of the possibility of double liability should he return. 22 Those
who own property with the absentee could find themselves with un-
marketable title, as the plaintiff in Bierhorst v. Kelly did, because of
potential claims of ownership by the absent person. 23
The deleterious effects that would result from ignoring the absence
make a regime necessary; the character of absence makes it unique.
Though the absentee has been likened to the minor and the interdict,24
he differs from them in ways that make the systems for administering
their property inapplicable to him. The goal of these regimes is to
19. See, e.g., Note, Property Law: The Estates of Missing Persons, 1966 Duke L.J.
745; Jalet, supra note 1, at 177.
20. A brief history of the presumption of continued life in common law is given in
Stone, The Presumption of Death: A Redundant Concept? 44 Mod. L. Rev. 516 (1981).
More detail is supplied by the surrogate's court of New York in Eagle, 4 Brad. at 118-
20. The presumption is there said to have originated in Justinian; see Dig. 7.1.56. The
presumption, according to Swinburne, prevented probate of the will of an absent person:
If it be unknowen whether the testator be living or dead: For as much as some
are of the opinion, that every man is presumed to live till he be an hundred
yeares olde: it seemeth by this opinion, that the Judge may not in the meane
time proceede to the publication of the testament, unlesse there be lawfull
proofe, or sufficient prescription for the testators death.
According to a second school of thought, the presumption was that life lasted seventy
years. H. Swinburne, A Briefe Treatise of Testaments and Last Willes 223 (1978) (lst
ed. 1590). On the presumption of continued life in Louisiana law, see infra text accom-
panying notes 161-68.
21. 151 La. 288, 91 So. 738 (1922).
22. 117 N.J. Super. 235, 284 A.2d 363 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1971).
23. 225 La. 934, 74 So. 2d 168 (1954).
24. C. Demolombe, Trait6 de l'absence § 1 (3rd ed. 1865).
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protect and further the interests of individuals who are present and able
to enjoy their estates, but incapacitated from managing them. 25 No
incertitude exists as to who should be protected and why. In contrast,
whether the absent person is still able to enjoy the rights he obtained
when present, whether he has created unknown claims upon his estate,
and whether he will return to profit from the protection given to him
are mysteries. 26 Hence, the interests of those with rights contingent upon
his death compete for consideration with the interests of those-including
the absent person-whose rights depend upon his continued life. 27
The common law and French-influenced civil law reacted differently
to the essential characteristic of the absent person. The common law
adopted a presumption of death that marked the point at which pro-
25. See, e.g., La. Civ. Code arts. 418, 404; La. Code Civ. P. arts. 4261-4263; C.
Civ. arts. 450, 500 (France).
26. Planiol regarded all three as unlikely: "[Miost of the questions discussed by
commentators are not found in actual practice; most of them suppose that the person
who has disappeared returns at a time when he is no longer expected. Now, this case is
very rarely encountered. Almost all absentees are persons who have died, but whose date
and place of death are not definitely known." I M. Planiol, supra note 3, § 613, at
370. The most notorious case of a returning absentee occurred in sixteenth century France.
See N. Davis, The Return of Martin Guerre (1983) (imposter assumed identity of man
absent for eight years, until exposed by return of absentee). The returning absentee has
haunted the common law from the time of the landmark case of Scott v. McNeal, 154
U.S. 34, 14 S. Ct. 1108 (1894) to the present (Martin v. Phillips, 514 So. 2d 338 (Miss.
1987)), but such a situation occurs more often in fiction than in reported cases. See, e.g.,
A. Dumas, Pare, Le Comte de Monte Cristo (avec A. Maquet) (1844-45) (returning absent
person assumes new identity, wreaks vengeance on those responsible for his disappearance);
Tennyson, Enoch Arden, Complete Poetical Works (1864; Cambridge ed. 1898) (returning
formerly shipwrecked absent person does not reveal himself to remarried spouse); My
Favorite Wife, dir. Garson Kanin (1940) (formerly shipwrecked absent person returns as
husband is about to remarry); The Search for Peter Kerry, Murder, She Wrote (CBS
television broadcast, Feb. 5, 1989) (returning amnesiac absent person is suspected of killing
individual who induced him to return).
27. In Cunnius v. Reading School District, 198 U.S. 458, 25 S. Ct. 721 (1905), the
Court, translating from the treatise of Demolombe, enumerated the interests which the
government has the power to protect in establishing laws governing absent persons:
Three characters of interest invoke a necessity for legislation concerning this
difficult and important subject. First. The interest of the person himself who
has disappeared .... Second. The duty of the lawmaker to consider the rights
of third parties against the absentee, especially those who have rights which
would depend upon the death of the absentee. Third. Finally, the general interest
of society which may require that property does not remain abandoned without
some one representing it and without an owner ....
Id. at 470-71 (quoting C. Demolombe, supra note 24, § 1). Demolombe and the Court
did not specify, among the interests of third parties, those which depend upon the continued
life of the absentee-those of a spouse or children or obligees acquired by the absent
person while he is alive in an unknown location. These interests may be classed, for the
purposes of this article, with those of the absentee, since both grow out of his ongoing
existence.
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tection shifted from the interests of the absentee to those of present
individuals. In contrast, the original Code civil des francais refused to
declare the absent person dead, gradually transferring primary protection
from him to his presumptive heirs. The present-day Louisiana regime
preserves this system. Its operation chronicles case after case of mis-
application and evasion. The original regime suffered from excessive
realism. It protected, for a lengthy period, one whose existence was
problematic, but whose death could not be established, at the expense
of those known to be alive. Once the interests of those present pre-
dominated, avoidance of the legal fiction of the presumption of death
made the extent of their rights uncertain.
This article examines, in Part I, the nature and usefulness of the
presumption of death, which the Louisiana regime lacks, and advocates
its incorporation. However, incorporation requires its coordination with
the regime. Part II examines the present Louisiana scheme to suggest
that, along with adoption of the presumption, other changes in the 182-
year-old system are called for. The Louisiana State Law Institute has
proposed a thorough revision of the title on absentees that would stream-
line its unwieldy and protracted stages of protection of the absentee.
The proposal combines the advantages of the legal presumption of death
at common law with those of a comprehensive regime in order to preserve
the rights of both the presumed heirs and the "living dead."
I. The Presumption of Death
A. The Common Law and Common Law Jurisdictions
The salient contribution of the common law to regulation of absent
persons' interests, the presumption of death based on absence for a
period of years, 28 appears in almost all common law states. 29 While
some rely solely on the common law presumption,3 0 most have embodied
it in a statute, either individual" or adapted from the Uniform Probate
28. In Cunnius, while arguing for the right of the state to regulate the estates of
absentees, the Court traced the regimes existing under Roman, French, Louisiana and
common law. Cunnius, 198 U.S. at 469-71, 21 S. Ct. at 724-25. The sole feature of the
latter was the presumption of death: "[Tlhe very fact of the presumption occasioned by
absence ... was a manifestation of the power to give legal effect to the status arising
from absence." Id. at 471, 25 S. Ct. at 725.
29. For a discussion of the rejection of the presumption of death, see infra text
accompanying notes 79-91.
30. For example, Wisconsin left intact its non-statutory common law presumption.
See Comment, Absentee's Property Act, 1942 Wis. L. Rev. 282-83.
31. See, e.g., Ark. Stat. Ann. § 16-40-105 (1987) (5 years); Cal. Evidence Code §
667 (Deering 1986) (5 years); Ind. Code Ann. § 29-2-5-1 (Burns Supp. 1988) (5 years);
Miss. Code Ann. § 13-1-23 (1972) (7 years).
[Vol. 50
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Code.3 2 The presumption establishes a valuable transition point after
which the absent person is treated as legally dead and his personal and
property rights ordered accordingly.
1. Elements and Nature of the Presumption
The requirements to establish the presumption of death have been
succinctly summarized by Wigmore: "It is generally said to arise from
the fact of the person's continuous absence from home, traditionally
for seven years, modernly for five years, unheard of by the persons
who would naturally have received news from the absentee." 33 The
argument has recently been made that, in Great Britain, the legal pre-
sumption now signifies merely strong circumstantial evidence of death.14
In the United States, the category into which the presumption falls varies
among the common law states. Some state statutes specify that the
presumption is one of law,35 and some state courts have so interpreted
their statutes if the nature of the presumption is unspecified.3 6 However,
in some jurisdictions the presumption has been regarded as one of fact
or as a mixed presumption of fact and law.3 7
Whether the presumption of death is treated as a legal presumption
or as something else determines its usefulness in ordering the affairs of
32. The Uniform Probate Code provides for a presumption of death after five years'
absence; Unif. Probate Code § 1-107(3), 8 U.L.A. 28 (1987). However, the time period
has been altered in some of the fifteen states that have adopted the code section. Some
states have returned to the traditional seven years; see, e.g., N.D. Cent. Code § 30.1-01-
04 (1981). Minnesota has shortened the period to four years; see Minn. Stat. Ann. §§
524.1-107(3) and 576.141 (West Supp. 1988).
33. 9 J. Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 2531a, at 462 (Chadbourn
rev. 1981).
34. Stone, supra note 20, at 524.
35. See, e.g., W. Va. Code § 44-9-1 (1982) (person absent and unheard of for seven
years is "presumed in law to be dead"); cf. Stump v. New York Life Ins. Co., 114 F.2d
214, 216 (4th Cir. 1940).
36. See, e.g., Va. Code § 64.1-105 (1987) and Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Goodwin,
92 F.2d 274, 276 (1937); Simpson v. Simpson, 162 Va. 621, 175 S.E. 320 (1934).
37. See Stump, 114 F.2d at 216 and the cases cited therein. The Uniform Probate
Code does not specify whether the presumption in § 1-107 (4) (1987) is a presumption
of law or of fact; because § 1-107 declares that "the rules of evidence in courts of general
jurisdiction .. .are applicable unless specifically displaced by the Code," each state which
has adopted the code would apply its rule concerning the presumption. However, in 1987,
§ 1-107 was amended to add § 1-107 (3), which provides for establishing the fact of
death by clear and convincing evidence, including circumstantial evidence. If absence were
merely circumstantial evidence of death, it would have been unnecessary to retain the
presumption, which appears as § 1-107 (4), and to which the language was added: "a
person whose death is not established under the preceding subparagraphs." The drafters
apparently regarded the presumption as a method of establishing death distinct from
inference.
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absent persons. A legal presumption, according to a number of com-
mentators on evidence, is a rule that dictates that the establishment of
the basic fact-in this instance, a set number of years of absence-is
sufficient to satisfy the burden of producing evidence of another, pre-
sumed fact-in this instance, death of the absent individual.3" A dis-
tinction exists between a presumed fact and an inferred one. As
McCormick observed, "Inferences that a trial judge decides may rea-
sonably be drawn from the evidence need no other description, even
though the judge relies upon precedent or a statute rather than his own
experience in reaching his decision. In most instances, the application
of any other label to an inference will only cause confusion." 3 9 Yet
labels such as "permissive presumption" and "presumption of fact" are
used to describe such inferences.4 To add to the confusion, the use of
the word presumption alone as a synonym for inference sometimes
occurs.41 But in its origins and in its most useful form, the presumption
of death is a legal presumption.
The introduction of the presumption of death on seven years' absence
occurred under circumstances indicating that a genuine presumption of
law was intended. Lord Ellenborough, in an 1805 case before the King's
Bench, traced the origin of the presumption of death to seventeenth-
century legislation. 42 The Statute of Bigamy of 1604 4 exempted
any Person or Persons whose Husband or Wife shall be con-
tinually remaining beyond the Seas by the Space of seven Years
together, or whose Husband or Wife shall absent him or herself
the one from the other by the Space of seven years together,
in any Parts within his Majesty's Dominions, the one of them
not knowing the other to be living within that Time."
The absentee's marriage was classed with those that had been dissolved
38. See, e.g., C. McCormick, Evidence § 342, at 965 (Cleary ed. 1984); 9 J. Wigmore,
supra note 33, § 2491, at 288; J. Thayer, Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at the Common
Law 317, 321, 326 (1898); E. Morgan, Basic Problems of Evidence 32 (1962).
39. C. McCormick, supra note 38, § 342, at 965.
40. For the term "permissive presumption," see C. McCormick, supra note 38, §
342, nn.9, 11, at 966. Wigmore observed, "The distinction between presumptions 'of law'
and presumptions 'of fact' is in truth the distinction between things that are in reality
presumptions ... and things that are not presumptions at all." Supra note 33, § 2491.
41. J. Wigmore, supra note 33, § 2491 n.2, at 288 and accompanying text.
42. Doe d. George v. Jesson, 6 East. 80, 102 Eng. Rep. 1217 (1805). Although the
first statute does not state the reason why the spouses of absentees are permitted to
remarry after seven years of absence, the second statute contains the characteristics of a
legal presumption. See infra text accompanying notes 48-52.
43. An Act to restrain all Person from Marriage until their former Wives and former
Husbands be dead, I Jac., ch. il (1604) [hereinafter Statute of Bigamy of 1604].
44. Id. § 11.
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because of ecclesiastical divorce or nullity, or lack of consent.45 This
exception, according to Lord Ellenborough, occurred because the absent
person was presumed to be dead46-death being yet another means by
which a first marriage was dissolved.4 7
The second seventeenth-century act of parliament relied on by Lord
Ellenborough, the Cestui qui vie Act of 1667, explicitly established a
legal presumption of death after seven years' absence. 48 The statute, like
the Statute of Bigamy, attempted to remedy a specific mischief created
by absenteeism: the life tenancy held by one whose existence was dubious.
The lessors and reversioners claiming the tenement had been required
to prove the absentee life tenant's death. 49 The act reversed the burden
of proof if two requirements were fulfilled. First, the life tenant must
have been absent in the legal sense: "the Lessors and Reversioners cannot
find out whether such Person or Persons be alive or dead," and "no
sufficient and evident proof be made of the Lives of such Person or
Persons respectively." 50 Second, the absence, either "beyond the seas,
or elsewhere," must be for "the Space of seven Years together." 5 ' In
that case, the absent life tenant "shall be accounted as naturally dead;
... and ... the Judges before whom such Action [to recover the
tenement] shall be brought, shall direct the Jury to give their Verdict
as if the Person ...were dead."52 The absentee's death in the Cestui
que vie Act of 1667 was a presumption of law, rather than a fact
inferred from absence. The statute shifted the burden to the proponent
of the absentee's continued life to prove it, and once the basic fact of
45. A second proviso insured the protection of participants in these marriages. Id.
§ II.
46. Doe d. George v. Jesson, 102 Eng. Rep. at 1219. The seriousness with which
bigamy was regarded is indicated by the language of the statute, which was passed to
prevent the "great Dishonour of God, and utter Undoing of divers honest Mens Children,
and others" which bigamy caused; it classified the crime as a felony which drew the
death penalty. Statute of Bigamy of 1604 § I.
47. Treitel, The Presumption of Death, 17 Mod. L. Rev. 530, 534 (1954). Treitel
takes issue with the statement that the Offences against the Person Act of 1861, which
contains a proviso similar to that in the 1604 statute, sanctions a presumption of death
after seven years; he maintains that the spouse would only require a defense if the absent
person proved to be alive. But Lord Ellenborough is pointing to the legislative motive
behind providing that defense, however limited the use of the 1604 statute may have been.
48. An Act for Redress of Inconveniencies by Want of Proof of the Deceases of
Persons beyond the Seas or absenting themselves, upon whose Lives Estates do depend,
18-19 Car. 2, ch. 11 (1667) [hereinafter Cestui que vie Act of 1667].
49. "[T]he Lessors and Reversioners when they have brought Actions for the Recovery
of their Tenements have been put upon it to prove the Death of their Tenants, when it
is almost impossible for them to discover the same." Id. § I.
50. Id. §§ 1, II.
51. Id.
52. Id.
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absence for seven years was established, the outcome-presumed death-
was mandated.
Using these two statutes, Lord Ellenborough, in Doe d. George v.
Jesson, imported into the common law a "presumption of the duration
of life, with respect to persons of whom no account can be given," to
determine whether the statute of limitations had run on the action before
him. 3 The presumption was that life ended "at the expiration of seven
years from the time when they were last known to be living." '5 4 The
statutes could thus be used by analogy to raise the presumption of death
after seven years' absence in any situation in which rights were contingent
upon an absentee's existence. By 1837, the Chief Justice of the Exchequer
Chamber could state, "[W]here a person goes abroad, and is not heard
of for seven years, the law presumes in fact that such person is dead." ' ,
In sum, the original common law presumption had a functional
simplicity. 6 It was raised by seven years of legal absence, either in the
realm or abroad. No further facts needed to be advanced. It was a
presumption of law, rather than an inference of fact, and thus shifted
the burden of proof to the party asserting the absentee's existence, who
could no longer rely on the presumption of continued life.17 Initially,
the time of death was set at the termination of the seven years, but as
early as Nepean v. Doe, in 1837, the time of death within that period
was set by the court. 8 After that point, rights that depended in some
way upon the absent person were allocated as if he were dead. As long
as the absent person did not return to disprove the presumed fact, many
of the issues raised by his absence could be resolved by the presumption. 9
2. Constitutional Requirements
In the United States, the presumption of death had to withstand a
grave challenge. Administration of the estate of an absentee based on
the presumption of death faced the obstacle of unconstitutionality in
53. Id. The action for ejectment, brought by the sister of a life tenant who had last
been seen around 1778, was untimely because she did not bring it within ten years of
his presumed death in 1785.
54. Doe d. George v. Jesson, 6 East. 80, 102 Eng. Rep. 1217, 1219 (1805). Not only
the death of the absentee, but also the time of death were thus established.
55. Nepean v. Doe, 150 Eng. Rep. 1021, 1028 (1837).
56. For later embellishments of the presumption in Great Britain, see Treitel, supra
note 47. Stone believes that these have made it non-functional in that country. Stone,
supra note 20, at 525.
57. Stone, supra note 20, at 519.
58. Nepean, 150 Eng. Rep. at 1028.
59. See supra notes 6-18 for the problems posed by absence. For a discussion of the
application of the presumption of death to resolve these issues, see Jalet, supra note 1,
at 181-203.
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the landmark nineteenth-century case of Scott v. McNeal.60 The Supreme
Court did not quarrel with the presumption of death as a means of
administering the property of a missing person, provided he never re-
turned. 61 It held, however, that once he proved to be alive, otherwise
legitimate acts became unconstitutional because he had been deprived
of property without due process. 62 The probate court lacked jurisdiction,
and the absentee lacked notice.63
The jurisdictional argument was not original to the United States
Supreme Court; fourteen states had earlier used jurisdictional grounds
to nullify administrations granted on estates of living persons. 64 Such
60. 154 U.S. 34, 14 S. Ct. 1108 (1894). The probate court in the territory of
Washington had granted letters of administration for Scott's estate seven years after his
disappearance on the basis of the presumption of death, the elements of which were
fulfilled. A year later, the McNeals bought land from Ward, who had purchased it from
Scott's estate; two years after that, Scott returned and brought an action for ejectment.
Id. at 34-37, 145 S. Ct. at 1108-10. The United States Supreme Court reversed the Supreme
Court of Washington's judgment for the defendants. To uphold an administration based
on the presumption, when the absentee either returned or was proved to be alive at the
time the administrator was appointed, would be to deprive the absentee of his property
without due process, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution. Id. at 50, 14 S. Ct. at 1114. The court appointing the administrator lacked
jurisdiction, and the taking was without notice to the absentee:
[Tihe jurisdiction of the court to which is committed the control and management
of the estates of deceased persons, by whatever name it is called . . . does not
exist or take effect before death. All proceedings of such courts in the probate
of wills and the granting of administrations depend upon the fact that a person
is dead, and are null and void if he is alive ....
As the jurisdiction to issue letters of administration upon his estate rests upon
the fact of his death, so the notice given before issuing such letters, assumes
that fact, and is addressed not to him, but to those who after his death may
be interested in his estate .... Notice to them cannot be notice to him, because
all their interests are adverse to his.
Id. at 48-49, 14 S. Ct. at 1113-14. For fuller accounts of the challenge to use of the
presumption of death in absentee cases and its defeat, see, e.g., F. Fraenkel, Missing
Persons: The Law In the United States and Europe 5-8 (1950); Chaffin, Dispensing with
Administration, Estates of Absentees, Simultaneous Death, Appointment and Qualification
of Domestic and Foreign Personal Representatives: A Critique of Statutory Requirements,
14 Ga. L. Rev. 681, 685-87 (1980); Hanna, Administration Upon Estates of Persons
Presumed to be Dead, 62 U. Pa. L. Rev. 605, 610-14 (1914); Jalet, supra note 18, at
203-14; Lees, Property Rights of Persons Who Have Disappeared, 9 Minn. L. Rev. 89,
89-96 (1925); Note, supra note 19, at 745-47.
61. Justice Gray observed:
The fact that a person has been absent and not heard from for seven years
may create such a presumption of his death as, if not overcome by other proof,
is such prima facie evidence of his death, that the probate court may assume
him to be dead and appoint an administrator of his estate.
Scott v. McNeal, 154 U.S. 34, 49-50, 14 S. Ct. 1108, 1113-14.
62. Id. at 48, 14 S. Ct. at 1113.
63. Id. at 48-50, 14 S. Ct. at 1113-14.
64. Id. at 43, 14 S. Ct. at 111.
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nullification required the return of property in the estate to a reappearing
absentee. 65 Even innocent third parties who relied on the authority of
the administrator in transactions with the estate could not be protected
without due process violation. 6 The United States Supreme Court, in
invoking the fourteenth amendment, prevented other states 67 from seeing
the jurisdictional issue otherwise.
The result of the Court's decision, *as well as of earlier state court
decisions, could have been to render the common law presumption of
death useless as a means of solving the problems confronting family,
creditors, and the state on the disappearance of an individual. 68 The
common law states were left with no means of settling the estate of an
individual who vanished. No reliance could be placed on letters of
administration granted after the seven years; because it is the essence
of absenteeism that one's status as living or dead is indeterminate, 69
any rights derived from the administration of an absentee's estate likewise
became indeterminate. The absentee, though presumptively dead, was
actually immortal.
In reaction to the chaos engendered by state and federal decisions,
many state legislatures enacted statutes that preserved the presumption
of death while solving the two due process problems identified by the
65. See, e.g., Duncan & Hooper v. Stewart, 25 Ala. 408 (1854) (administrator's sale
of slave belonging to an absentee who returned was a nullity); Jochumsen v. Suffolk
Sav. Bank, 3 Allen 87 (Mass. 1861) (bank was liable to returned absentee for deposit
released to administrator); Moore v. Smith, 11 Rich. 569 (S.C. 1858) (transactions by
administrator of estate of absentee held null and void).
66. The Supreme Court adopted the view of the Second Circuit Court of the United
States for the Southern District of New York that states could not constitutionally make
a judicial determination that a man is dead, made in his absence, and without
any notice to or process issued against him, conclusive for the purpose of
divesting him of his property and vesting it in an adminstrator, for the benefit
of his creditors and next of kin, either absolutely or in favor of those only
who innocently deal with such administrator. The immediate and necessary effect
of such a law is to deprive him of his property without any process of law
whatever, as against him, although it is done by process of law against other
people, his next of kin, to whom notice is given.
Scott v. McNeal, 154 U.S. 34, 50, 14 S. Ct. 1108, 1114.
67. Besides the Supreme Court of Washington, courts in New York and New Jersey
had likewise departed from what was at least the plurality rule. See Plume v. Howard
Savings Institution, 46 N.J.L. 211 (1884) (withdrawal of deposit by administrator of
absentee would bar recovery by absentee should he return); Roderigas v. East River
Savings Institution, 63 N.Y. 460 (1875), rev'd on other grounds, 76 N.Y. 316 (1879)
(letters of administration issued by surrogate's court were conclusive evidence to bank of
her authority to draw out bank deposit, barring recovery by second administratrix appointed
after his death).
68. For the problems posed by such a disappearance, see supra text accompanying
notes 8-15.
69. See supra text accompanying notes 3-4.
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courts. In Scott, the Supreme Court had declared that, with the exception
of Louisiana, 70 the states had not granted jurisdiction over the estate
of a living absent person to their courts, not that they could not.7' In
the landmark case of Cunnius v. Reading School District,72 the United
States Supreme Court upheld a Pennsylvania statute empowering the
orphans' court to issue letters of administration "as valid as if the
supposed decedent were really dead" on the estates of living persons
who were absent for seven years. 73 Explicit provisions for notice to the
absentee, allowing twelve weeks for him or anyone else to prove that
he was still alive, remedied the second due process problem. 74 The loyalty
to the presumption of death, in its constitutional form, continues in
the absentee legislation of most common law states."
The Cunnius court suggested in dicta two further limitations on
state power. Due process under the fourteenth amendment would be
lacking if the state created "an arbitrary and unreasonable presumption
of death resulting from absence for a brief period."176 Moreover, "if a
state law, in providing for the administration of the estate of the
absentee, contained no adequate safeguards concerning property, and
amounted therefore simply to authorizing the transfer of the property
of the absentee to others ... such a law would be repugnant to the
Fourteenth Amendment. ' 77 Pennsylvania's statute, which required se-
curity from the supposed decedent's distributees unless an exception was
70. The Court approvingly summarized the "careful regulations" contained in La.
Civ. Code arts. 47-85, "Of Absentees." Scott v. McNeal, 154 U.S. 34, 42, 14 S. Ct.
1108, 1111. Louisiana's supreme court was among those that had declared void for want
of jurisdiction the appointment of an administrator of an absentee's estate; however, the
nullity resulted from failure to follow the absentee procedure, not from the inability of
the state to provide such administration. See Burns v. Van Loan, 29 La. Ann. 560, 563
(1877).
71. In fact, the approval given to the Louisiana law of absentees indicated that
granting such power was within the scope of the states' authority. See Cunnius v. Reading
School District, 198 U.S. 458, 473, 25 S. Ct. 721 (1904), where the argument is explicitly
made.
72. 198 U.S. 458, 25 S. Ct. 721 (1904) (interest arrearages paid to administrator of
absentee's estate could not be recovered by returned absentee).
73. Id. at 459, 25 S. Ct. at 722.
74. Id. at 459, 477, 25 S. Ct. at 722, 727.
75. The statutory presumption of death takes two forms in state legislation; it may
be a preservation of the common law presumption of death, or it may have been adopted
as part of Uniform Probate Code. For examples of each, see supra, notes 31 and 32.
76. Cunnius v. Reading School District, 198 U.S. 458, 476-77, 25 S. Ct. 721, 727.
As Wigmore has pointed out, the seven year presumption of death, approved in this case,
is necessarily arbitrary; see infra note 80. Thus, the Court's objection must rest with an
arbitrary cut off which is excessively short. How short is too short has never been
determined.
77. Id. at 477, 25 S. Ct. at 727.
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made by the orphans' court, was considered sufficiently careful of the
absentee's property rights.7"
To escape unconstitutionality, therefore, a legislative act, establishing
a presumption of death and relying on the opening of a missing person's
succession as the means of determining the rights of others to an absent
person's property, must have the following features: the court must have
jurisdiction over the property of the individual; notice to the absent
person must be attempted; the lapse of time before the presumption
can be raised must be reasonable; and finally, some safeguard for the
absent person must exist should he return.
3. Other Objections
Despite the constitutional challenge, the presumption has, according
to Wigmore, met with "universal acceptance," 79 yet he himself objected
to it as "arbitrary, unpractical, anachronistic, and obstructive." 80 His
enmity arose from his belief that seven years was "absurdly long"',
and that a single presumption was inadequate to deal with the variety
of circumstances in which absence occurred and the different legal issues
that arose from it.82 The Uniform Absence as Evidence of Death and
Absentees' Property Act, which he proposed as a substitute, 3 would
abandon the presumption altogether in favor of a finding of death by
a jury. 4 If there is insufficient evidence to find death, the missing
person's property would be distributed, and a statute of limitations
placed on his ability to make claims against the estate.8 5 From an
insurance fund created with a portion of each estate so distributed, the
court would reimburse the absentee in an amount it considered "fair
and adequate" should he return.
8 6
Wigmore's tirade against the presumption of death has fallen, for
the most part, on deaf legislative ears. Only Tennessee and Wisconsin 7
use the Uniform Act. Moreover, Wisconsin, in adopting it, omitted
78. Id. at 460, 477, 25 S. Ct. at 722, 727.
79. J. Wigmore, supra note 33, § 2531a, at 464. Wigmore is speaking only of common
law, as the full title of his work indicates (Evidence in Trials at Common Law). He
points out that the presumption has been rejected in Louisiana as inconsistent with article
70 of the state's civil code. Id., n.l.
80. Id. § 2531b. Later, in the same section, he terms it "outworn and inefficient."
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Uniform Absence as Evidence of Death and Absentees' Property Act [hereinafter
Uniform Act], § 1 (1), 8A U.L.A. 5 (1983).
85. Id. § 6 (2), at 10.
86. Id. § 11, at 13.
87. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 30-3-101 to 30-3-114 (1984 and Supp. 1989); Wis. Stat.
Ann. §§ 813.22-813.34 (West 1977).
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Section 1, and thus retained the common law presumption of death.8
Tennessee initially retained the presumption of death for purposes of
distributing absentees' funds and personal property. s9 Maryland, which
had adopted the act, repealed it in 1973, but continues to reject the
presumption of death. 90 North Carolina has also abandoned the pre-
sumption in a statute modeled on the Uniform Act. 91
One reason that the Uniform Act and its imitators may have met
with resistance is that they are no more convenient to apply than the
common law presumption. The nature of absence dictates that, in most
cases, the date of death of an absentee cannot be established by cir-
cumstantial evidence. 92 If evidence suggestive of the missing person's
death exists, there is no need to wait for the passage of time required
by the presumption to prove it. 3 If seven years have passed, evidence
can establish an earlier date of death, for the majority of the jurisdictions
have modified Lord Ellenborough's original statement so that only death
itself, and not the time of death, is presumed. 94 Even in a state that
adheres to the original rule that death is presumed to occur at the end
of the period, circumstantial evidence of an earlier death makes the
presumption unnecessary. 95
88. See Uniform Act, supra note 84, § 1, annotation.
89. See Armstrong v. Pilot Life Ins. Co., 656 S.W.2d 18, 26-27 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1983). This decision has been legislatively overruled; see Tenn. Code Ann. § 30-3-102(c)
(Supp. 1989).
90. See "General Statutory Note," Uniform Act, supra note 84, § 1, at 4. For the
failure of Maryland to reinstate the presumption of death, see Md. Code Ann. § 3-102
(1984).
91. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 28C-1 to 28C-22 (1984).
92. See supra text accompanying notes 3-4.
93. See, e.g., Fidelity Mut. Life Ass'n v. Mettler, 185 U.S. 308, 22 S. Ct. 662 (1901)
(affirming finding of death of insured, whose beneficiary sued one year after disappearance,
on circumstantial evidence that he had fallen into Pecos River while camping nearby and
drowned); In re Bobrow's Estate, 14 Misc. 2d 816, 179 N.Y.S.2d 742 (N.Y. Sur. Ct.
1958) (finding death of missing woman and granting letters of administration to husband
six months after disappearance, on circumstantial evidence that she was in her home when
it burned to the ground); Will of Conrad, 109 Misc. 2d 756, 440 N.Y.S.2d 991 (N.Y.
Sur. Ct. 1981) (finding death one year after missing person headed in yacht from the
Bahamas for West Palm Beach, failed to make radio contact after hitting choppy Gulf
Stream, and was never seen again despite extensive search); Skele v. Mutual Benefit Life
Ins. Co., 20 Ohio App.3d 213, 485 N.E.2d 770 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984) (affirming finding
of death less than a year after disappearance of backpacker when circumstantial evidence
indicated he had fallen into "savage" river).
94. Jalet, supra note 1, at 189. This is also the English rule, id. For examples of
its application, see supra note 2.
95. See, e.g., Commonwealth Life Ins. Co. v. Caudill's Adm'r, 266 Ky. 581, 99
S.W.2d 745 (1936), on rehearing, 276 Ky. 149, 122 S.W.2d 989 (1938). The missing
insured, Caudill, had been gambling in a building on the edge of a river, where he had
gone after expressing a determination to get his money back; a fight broke out; a witness
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Failing establishment of the actual time of death, the Uniform Act
and similar statutes rely on a limitations period, to be set by the state,
for distributing the property of the absentee to his presumptive heirs.
The length of such a period will necessarily be arbitrary. Tennessee has
set it at seven years, Wisconsin, Maryland, and North Carolina at five.9 6
The difference between a limitations period and a presumption of death
after five or seven years of absence, which can be avoided by proving
that the absent person disappeared in life-endangering circumstances,
appears merely one of terminology. 97
A more appropriate objection to reliance on the common law pre-
sumption of death is that its usefulness has been watered down by
multiplication of the basic facts necessary to trigger the presumption.
The advantage of the legal presumption is that it provides a means for
the court to make a decision concerning rights dependent on the ab-
sentee's death when actual evidence of death is lacking. 9s Imposing
requirements other than absence for a stated period transforms the
presumption; absence becomes merely one more piece of evidence from
which death can be inferred. For the presumption to be raised, the
absentee must be unheard of by those with whom he would naturally
be in contact. 99 The element that the absent person be unheard of has
been extended to require diligent search by the party relying on the
presumption.'00 As long as a reasonable standard of diligence is estab-
who attempted to intervene was chased off at gunpoint by one "Big Ed" Spicer, who
was subsequently killed; a splash was heard; a search was made for Caudill, who was
never seen again. Id. at 583, 99 S.W.2d at 746. Kentucky adheres to the presumption
that death occurred at the end of seven years of absence. Id. at 584, 99 S.W.2d 747.
Yet a jury decision that the missing person died on the night he vanished was upheld
on rehearing. 276 Ky. 149, 122 S.W. 989.
96. Tenn. Code Ann. § 30-3-108 (1984); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 813.26(2) (West 1977);
Md. Code Ann. § 3-106(b) (1984); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 28C-11(c) (1984).
97. A further reason for the unpopularity of the Uniform Act may be that through
liberative prescription, it bars the absentee from recovering his property. His only restitution
upon return is the discretionary amount awarded from the insurance fund established by
the state treasury. See Uniform Act, supra note 84, §§ 6, 11. The United States Supreme
Court has upheld statutes divesting absent persons from any interest in their property on
the basis of a limitation period, provided proper notice is given; see Blinn v. Nelson,
222 U.S. 1, 32 S. Ct. 1 (1911). However, in Louisiana, ownership cannot be lost by non-
use; the petitory action is imprescriptible. See A. Yiannopoulos, Property § 180 n.92, at
482 and § 201, at 541 (2 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise 2d ed. 1980).
98. For a discussion of the nature of a legal presumption, see supra text accompanying
notes 34-41.
99. For the elements of the presumption, see supra text accompanying note 33.
100. See, e.g., Lemire v. National Life Ass'n, 194 Iowa 1245, 1247, 191 N.W. 67,
68 (1922) (person invoking the presumption in order to recover under absentee's life
insurance policy must make "diligent inquiry" among those likely to know whereabouts
of absentee); In re Katz's Estate, 135 Misc. 861, 871, 239 N.Y.S. 722, 736-37 (N.Y. Sur.
Ct. 1930) (presumption of death could not arise without demonstration of a "thorough
and exhaustive search" for the absentee by the person invoking the presumption).
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lished, 0 1 the requirement serves a beneficial purpose; it forces one who
wishes to claim an advantage on the basis of absence to demonstrate
it. Some courts, however, have demanded not only that the party be
unable to locate the absent person, but also that the search be commenced
at the beginning of the absence.1 0 2 Thus, a party unaware of his interest
could forfeit the presumption by delay in searching.
Another accretion to the elements of the presumption derives from
the basic fact discussed above. If the absentee must be unheard of by
those who would naturally hear from him, there must be individuals
who would normally remain in touch with the absent person for the
presumption to be raised. 03 As one commentator observed, such a
requirement would "deprive a party of the benefit of the presumption
in cases where most of all it should apply," perhaps because of the
unlikelihood of obtaining information about such an absentee.' °1
An additional expansion of the elements of the presumption appears
as a requirement that the absence be "unexplained" 105 or "for no
apparent reason."'16 For example, the regulations governing social se-
curity survivors' insurance benefits incorporate the presumption of death
on the unexplained absence of the wage earner for seven years:
101. But see Katz, 135 Misc. at 871-72, 239 N.Y.S. at 737, requiring that the party
seeking to establish the presumption be a wealthy mind-reader: It is necessary to examine,
"not only . . . the place from which the last information of the absentee came, but also
... every other locality to which his known inclinations, habits, and associations might
reasonably be supposed to have led him." See also, Lemire v. National Life Ass'n, 194
Iowa 1245, 191 N.W. 67, 69 (1922) (search of absentee's destination, and of cities where
he had been sighted, insufficient). A major difficulty appears to be that the person left
behind has no means of knowing whether the search will be regarded as sufficient until
the court rules on it.
102. See, e.g., Katz, 135 Misc. at 872, 239 N.Y.S. at 737 ("So far as this court is
concerned, its inclination is to view with skepticism any protestations of ardent desire to
find the absentee where diligent search has not been made for him as soon as his absence
became known, without awaiting the accrual of some pecuniary advantage to be gained
by his death or the passage of the period mentioned in the statute .. "); Estate of
Morrison, 92 Il1. 2d 207, 65 Ill. Dec. 276, 441 N.E.2d 68, 70 (1982) (failure of claimant
to search for absent co-heir seven years prior to time when inheritance would have devolved
on husband and been transmitted to her prevented her from establishing that he was
absent for seven years at that time).
103. The Stump court rejected this addition to the requirements to raise the pre-
sumption; 114 F.2d 214, 215 (4th Cir. 1940). However, it was utilized in the British case
of Chard v. Chard [1955] 3 W. L. R. 954, 963-64 (nullification of marriage on grounds
that first wife could not be presumed dead, despite thirty-nine years of absence, because
no one had been shown to exist who was likely to have heard from her).
104. Mason, A Matter of Life and Death, 106 Law J. 359, 360 (1956); see also,
Nokes, No Presumption of Death, 19 Mod. L. Rev. 208 (1956).
105. See, e.g., Banks v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 142 Neb. 823, 8 N.W.2d 185
(Neb. 1943) (though departure of daughter eleven years earlier was explained by tension
with her parents, continued absence not explained, giving rise to presumption of death).
106. 20 C.F.R. § 404.721(b) (1989).
19901
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
If you cannot prove the person is dead but evidence of death
is needed, we will presume he or she died at a certain time if
you give us the following evidence:
(b) Signed statements by those in a position to know and
other records which show that the person has been absent
from his or her residence for no apparent reason, and has
not been heard from, for at least 7 years. If there is no
evidence available that he or she is still alive, we will use
as the person's date of death either the date he or she left
home, the date ending the 7 year period, or some other
date depending upon what the evidence shows is the most
likely date of death. 07
Five of the United States Circuit Courts of Appeals read the reg-
ulation to require a claimant to show merely that the wage earner has
been absent and unheard of for at least seven years. 08 The Department
of Health and Human Services, however, has maintained that the claim-
ant must demonstrate the non-existence of a reason for the absence
before the presumption can arise. 0 9 Thus, where the claimant's spouse
was a mobster who might have been a fugitive from justice, the Secretary
denied social security survivors' benefits to his wife and two children,
despite a twelve-year absence."10
Expansions of the requirements for raising the presumption of death
based on absence all spring from the tendency to seek greater assurance
than absence can give that the missing person is really dead."' But by
107. Id.
108. See, e.g., Autrey v. Harris, 639 F.2d 1233 (5th Cir. 1981); Edwards v. Califano,
619 F.2d 865 (10th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Califano, 607 F.2d 1178 (6th Cir. 1979);
Aubrey v. Richardson, 462 F.2d 782 (3d Cir. 1972); and Secretary of Health, Education
and Welfare v. Meza, 368 F.2d 389 (9th Cir. 1966).
109. See Mando v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 737 F.2d 278, 281 (2d
Cir. 1984).
110. Id. at 279. The court, refusing to decide between the conflicting standards, assumed
arguendo that the presumption had been raised, and concluded that it had been rebutted.
It then remanded the case for a decision as to whether the claimant's evidence that her
husband may have been "rubbed out" by his Mafia employers established his death. Id.
at 281-282.
Il1. A logical extension of the quest for certainty is transformation of the presumption
of death into an inference of fact; some courts view the presumption as such an inference.
See, e.g., Lemire v. National Life Ass'n, 194 Iowa 1245, 1245, 191 N.W. 67, 67 (requiring
"facts and circumstances ... sufficient to end the presumption of life" for the presumption
of death to arise); In re Katz's Estate, 239 N.Y.S. 722, 730 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1930) (identifying
the presumption of death as a mixed presumption of fact and law, "with the factual
element the more important"). As Stone points out, if the factual inference is possible,
the presumption is redundant, Stone, supra note 20, at 524-25. Moreover, the person is
not, in the legal sense, absent. See supra, notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
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making the presumption more difficult to raise, they undercut its use-
fulness; it is precisely because the absentee's fate is uncertain that a
presumption of death is needed. Blocking the presumption is unrealis-
tic:1 1 2 the absent person may not have been sought at the outset of his
disappearance; he may be so alone that there is no one with whom he
would communicate; a reason for his departure may be postulated; but
he is not immortal. A rule is needed that determines rights contingent
on his death, and his legal relationship to present individuals, without
depending on evidence of actual death. The presumption of death is
one such rule.
B. The Presumption of Death in the Louisiana Civil Law
1. The French Prototype and Its Present Application
The title "Des absents" in the Code civil des francais of 1804113
created a paradigm for the treatment of absent persons.1 1 4 In contrast
to its gradual emergence in common law jurisdictions, the law of absent
persons in the Code Napol6on was conceived as a comprehensive unit
to deal with the unique problem of absentees. " 5 But the Code Napoleon
contained no legal presumption of death. Instead it acknowledged that
the absent person's existence was unknowable." 6 It determined personal
and property rights by balancing the interests of the one whose life was
112. Conferring immortality upon the absentee does profit life insurance companies
(see, e.g., Lemire, 191 N.W. at 67; Banks v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 142 Neb. 823,
824, 8 N.W.2d 185), and government agencies that would otherwise have to pay out
pensions (see supra notes 89 and 91) or succession proceeds which would escheat to the
state (see Estate of Morrison, 92 Ill. 2d 707, 65 III. Dec. 276, 441 N.E.2d 68).
113. [hereinafter Code Napoleon], C. Civ. arts. 112-143.
114. The Code Napoleon and a similar regime in the Louisiana Civil Code of 1808
were cited by the Supreme Court of the United States as evidence of the power of the
state to regulate the rights of absent persons in Cunnius v. Reading School Dist., 198
U.S. 458, 470-71, 25 S. Ct. 721, 724 (1904). In its Louisiana version, its provisions were
held up as a model of "careful regulations" by Justice Gray in Scott v. McNeal, 154
U.S. 34, 42, 14 S. Ct. 1108, 1111 (1894).
115. Treatises of the most noted French commentators contain comprehensive analyses
of the regime of absent persons in the Code Napoleon. The most detailed and theoretical
of these is Demolombe, who devoted an entire volume to the subject; see C. Demolombe,
supra note 24. See also, e.g., C. Aubry & C. Rau, Droit Civil Francais §§ 147-161, at
957-1012 (vol. 12); 1 M. Planiol, supra note 3, §§ 612-636, at 369-81; 1 M. Planiol &
G. Ripert, Traite pratique de droit civil francais §§ 47-65, at 51-79 (7th ed. 1964); 1 G.
Baudry-Lacantinerie & M. Houques-Fourcade, Traite theorique et pratique de droit civil
§§ 1055-1325, at 869-1070 (Des personnes vol. 1) (2d ed. 1902); V. Marcad6, Explication
Theoretique et Pratique du code civil §§ 335-515 (7th ed. 1873). See also, D. Roughol-
Valdeyron, Recherches Sur l'absence en droit francais (1970).
In contrast, there has been no comprehensive examination of the Louisiana regime in
its one hundred and eighty-two years of existence.
116. See supra note 4; see also C. Demolombe, supra note 24, § 1.
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uncertain against those of individuals indubitably alive, and against those
of the state." 7 The original French system still determines the rights
affected by absence in Louisiana: Book 1, title 3 of the state's Civil
Code in large measure mirrors the original French regime." 8 Of the
thirty-seven articles presently in effect, only twelve have neither a direct
nor an indirect source in the Code Napoleon; twenty-three parallel the
language of the French source.
Because the original French code did not abandon the possibility
that the absent person might be alive, the balance of interests in the
property that he had amassed before disappearing weighed heavily in
his favor. Its imitator, the Louisiana Civil Code, likewise contains an
elaborate mechanism for affording great protection to the absentee's
rights. Louisiana decisions repeatedly underscore the primacy given to
the absentee. In Sassman v. Aime," 9 the Supreme Court of Louisiana
pointed to the regime of absent persons as a means by which the plaintiffs
would have
preserved [the rights] of the absentee, whose death the law is
so far from presuming, that it watches over and protects his
property for a number of years, in the hope, and expectation
that he may again return. The motives which induced the leg-
islator to thus guard the estate of absent persons, or of those
who may have disappeared, are obvious, and this court feels
that it is important to society that the law on this subject should
be strictly and rigidly inforced (sic).120
117. C. Demolombe, supra note 24, § 1.
118. Whether French or Spanish law was the source of A Digest of the Civil Laws
Now in Force in the Territory of Orleans, With Alterations and Amendments Adapted
to its Present Form of Government, has long been a matter of debate; see Batiza, The
Louisiana Civil Code of 1808: Its Actual Sources and Present Relevance, 46 Tul. L. Rev.
4 (1971); Pascal, Sources of the Digest of 1808: A Reply to Professor Batiza, 46 Tul.
L. Rev. 603 (1972); and Batiza, Sources of the Civil Code of 1808, Facts and Speculation:
A Rejoinder, 46 Tul. L. Rev. 628 (1972). The source annotations of Moreau Lislet indicate
that, of the thirty-two articles on absent persons in the digest, only three could be traced
directly to Spanish sources, while art. 29 was a derogation from the Fuero Real, 11 tit.
I liv. 3. See L. Moreau Lislet, ed. A Digest of the Civil Laws Now in Force in the
Territory of Orleans (1808) Containing Manuscript References to its Sources and Other
Civil Laws on the Same Subjects, facing pages 15 and 21 (n.d. & photo. reprint, 1968).
It is well established that the Louisiana Civil Code of 1825 relied heavily on the Code
Napoleon; see A. Yiannopoulos, Louisiana Civil Law System Coursebook 33 (1977). The
absentee provisions of the 1825 code were retained in the revision of 1870, which, with
minor changes, remains in force at present.
119. 9 Mart. (o.s.) 257 (La. 1821).
120. Id. at 263-64. Demolombe justifies the state's intervention on behalf of the absentee
on the grounds of his possible inability to protect himself:
If it is true that in general, each person is held to watch out, at his risk and
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Later, the court formulated a general policy: "[E]very law that permits
our courts to decide on the rights of those who are absent, should be
strictly construed; and ... the formalities which it prescribes exactly
followed.''2 Again, in affirming a district court decision refusing to
permit seizure by his co-owner of the share of undivided property
belonging to a person absent for thirty years to pay for unnecessary
improvements made without his consent, the court commended "[t]he
vigilance which the District Judge thought proper to exercise for the
protection of an absent defendant" as "creditable to the administration
of justice. 1' 22 This policy of vigilance is founded, as the Sassman court
pointed out, on the refusal to regard the missing person as dead.
2. Is There a Presumption of Death in the Louisiana Regime of
Absence?
Jalet concludes that Louisiana was one of the states that enacted
"legislation setting forth the common law presumption of death" on
the basis of articles 60, 61 and 70.123 Article 60 grants early provisional
possession of the absentee's estate where there are "strong presumptions
peril, with the care of his affairs, the law must nevertheless afford its protection
to the incapacity of those who cannot themselves govern their fortune....
[N]ow, it is natural to presume that the person who has disappeared, if he still
exists, is held back and prevented by some obstacle much stronger than his
will; thus, it is necessary from then on to put him in the number of incapables,
of whom the law itself protects the interests.
C. Demolombe, supra note 24, § 1.
121. Hill v. Barlow, 6 Rob. 142, 148 (La. 1843). See also, Collins v. Pease's Heirs,
17 La. 116, 117 (1841) (waiver of objection to improper testimony by curator ad hoc,
by compromising interests of absent defendants, resulted in reversal and de novo trial);
Edmonson v. Mississippi and Alabama R.R. Co., 13 La. 282, 284 (1839) (curator ad hoc
had no capacity to waive production of legal evidence); Stockton v. Hasluck, 10 Mart.
(o.s.) 472, 474 (La. 1821) (procedural statute requiring notice at last residence of absent
defendant before attaching his property must be "construed strictly, as every law should
be, that derogates so much from the general principles of our jurisprudence, and decides
on the rights of those who are absent."). In Hill, Edmonson, and Stockton, in contrast
to Sassman, the defendant "absentees" fit the French term "non-presents"-those not
present in the state; see 1 M. Planiol, supra note 3, § 612, at 369-70. The recital of the
facts of Collins make it impossible to determine whether the absent heirs were merely
out of the state, or if their existence was unknown. The intense concern for the absentee's
rights is underscored by the fact that the court was so careful to protect those who could
protect themselves, had they been willing to submit to its personal jurisdiction.
For a discussion of the ambiguous use of the term "absentee" in Louisiana law, see
infra, text accompanying notes 251-267.
122. Smith v. Wilson, 10 La. Ann. 255, 258 (1855).
123. Jalet, supra note 1, at 198 and n.96.
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that the person absent has perished"; article 70 declares that "a pre-
sumption of death shall follow" an absence of seven years. 24 The
successions regime permits opening of a succession "by presumption of
death caused by long absence."' 125 The jurisprudence speaks, on occasion,
of the presumed death of an individual or of a time after which death
may be presumed. 26 One of the revised statutes empowers the state
registrar to issue a "presumptive death" certificate.127 A series of statutes
insure that military personnel presumed dead by the armed forces will
be so regarded under state law. 2
Two objections can be made to the contention that Louisiana law
contains a presumption of death based on these instances. First, in most
of these references, the term "presumption" is used loosely to mean a
variety of things, from a suggestive circumstance to an inference to
actual proof, but not what is meant by a presumption at law. Second,
the judiciary attempted to invoke a presumption of death in a context
in which it could not function because its use would have been contrary
to the positive law of the absentee regime. Only in one narrow situation,
in deference to federal law governing the military, has Louisiana created
a genuine legal presumption of death of absent persons.
a. Imprecise Use of the Term "Presumption"
Article 60 of the Louisiana Civil Code allows the absent person's
property to be put into the hands of his presumed heirs "when it has
been shown that there are strong presumptions that the person absent
has perished.' ' 29 First, they are not legal presumptions; the construction
of the article indicates that the "presumptions" are the facts, not a
legal consequence uniformly attached to certain facts. a0 The Supreme
Court of Louisiana, interpreting this passage of article 60 in Iberia
Cypress Co. v. Thorgeson, read it to mean "that it must first be shown
by legal evidence that the absent person was exposed to certain perils
to life, and since such exposure has never been heard of .... ,"Ia "Pres-
umptions" here signifies "certain perils to life," circumstances or in-
dications suggestive of death. Second, if established and unrebutted,
they do not result in treatment of the absent person as dead. His
124. La. Civ. Code arts. 60, 70.
125. La. Civ. Code art. 934.
126. See infra text accompanying notes 169-79.
127. La. R.S. 40:49(B)(8)(a)-(c) (Supp. 1989).
128. La. R.S. 9:1441-1443 and 9:304 (1965).
129. La. Civ. Code art. 60.
130. See the discussion of the nature of the common law presumption of death, supra
notes 34-41 and accompanying text.
131. 116 La. 218, 40 So. 682, 683 (1906).
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presumptive heirs do not succeed to his*estate, but merely administer
it under extremely restrictive conditions. 3 2
The Iberia Cypress court misused the rule of article 60 to examine,
not whether the absent person's presumptive heirs were entitled to pro-
visional possession, but whether he was dead in the year 1890.1'3 The
case is one in a long line of Louisiana jurisprudence permitting proof
of death by circumstantial evidence. 34 Iberia Cypress exemplifies another
confusing use of "presumption"; in these cases, it denotes an inference
from circumstantial evidence. The demonstration of peril to life was
necessary, according to the court, for a "presumption of death"' 35 to
arise: "Death, like any other fact, may be proved by circumstantial
evidence; but the circumstances under which the person disappeared
must be proved by competent evidence as the basis for the presump-
tion.' 3 6 But if the evidence were sufficient to prove the death of the
absentee, no presumption would be needed.
The Iberia Cypress court has not been alone in conflating pre-
sumption and proof of death. In Martinez v. Succession of Vives, the
state supreme court, rejecting the evidence of death, declared, "There
are occurrences-as a wreck, a battle, or the like-which would authorize
a court in presuming the death of one, known to have been exposed
132. La. Civ. Code arts. 65-67. For a description of the restraints on provisional
possession, see infra text accompanying notes 318-27.
133. Iberia Cypress Co., 116 La. at 219, 40 So. at 683.
134. See supra note 2; see also, e.g., Marrero v. Nelson, 166 La. 122, 124, 116 So.
722 (1928) (the "facts and circumstances ... suffice for concluding that the person who
disappeared is dead," and thus could not participate in a partition of succession property,
when the house in which he had resided in San Francisco was destroyed in the 1906
earthquake); Miller v. Hartford Live Stock Ins. Co., 165 La. 777, 116 So. 182 (1928)
(Boyd language quoted to support finding that horse which disappeared while being
transported in a boxcar which opened directly into Lake Pontchartrain was dead, and
the owner entitled to recover on life insurance policy of horse); Sterrett v. Samuel, 108
La. 346, 349, 32 So. 428, 429 (1902) (plaintiff's succession rights established on proof
that the deceased's father disappeared, along with the boat on which he served, after it
had put in at Mobile during a yellow fever epidemic, and then made for Havana; the
"circumstances are sufficient to justify the conclusion in a case like this that the man is
dead."); Clay v. District Grand Lodge No. 21, 154 So. 654 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1934)
("the facts and circumstances of the case ...are of a character to convince the judicial
mind that the assured is dead" when the 85-year-old insured, subject to recurrent epileptic
fits and heart attacks, missing for two years, was last seen en route to a swamp on the
first day of eight days of heavy rainfall and cold weather); Wagner v. Supreme Industrial
Life Ins. Co., 17 So. 2d 756, 757 (La. App. Orl. 1944) (plaintiff could recover on life
insurance policy of the missing insured, a seaman on a torpedoed vessel).
In the light of these cases, despite the adjective in the code, the "presumptions" called
for in article 60 would have to be weak rather than strong for the rule to be of any
use.
135. Iberia Cypress Co. v. Thorgeson, 116 La. 218, 222, 40 So. 682, 683 (La. 1906).
136. Id.
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to the perils of either; but such a presumption 'must be weighty, precise
and consistent.' The ascertained facts on which it rested, must draw
with them, as a necessary consequence, the unascertained facts sought
to be established, 'and exclude every other rational conclusion.' "137 The
court employed the term "presumption" while rejecting its legal signif-
icance; a fact that follows from another by rational necessity is proved,
not presumed. In Jamison v. Smith, the court adopted a more flexible
standard of proof of death and, again, termed it a presumption. At
the same time, the lack of a code provision akin to the common law
presumption of death was recognized:
We think the circumstances under which he left [to join the
army during the Civil War] and the lapse of time since his
disappearance [twenty years] fully justify the presumption of his
death. It is true that time sufficient has not elapsed to give rise
of itself, apart from attending circumstances, under the Articles
of the Code, to the presumption of death. But the Code does
not establish any arbitrary rule on the subject. It has been
frequently held that the time for the establishment of the pre-
sumption of death, on account of absence, is not absolutely
fixed and immutable, but is subject to be modified according
to the circumstances attending such absence. The lapse of time
is but a circumstance to be considered in conjunction with other
circumstances. 138
These cases supply a possible meaning for the "presumption of death
caused by long absence, in the cases established by law" that opens a
succession. 3 9 While the Louisiana Civil Code establishes no such "cases,"
the drafters of article 934 may have used the term, as the state supreme
court would do later, to refer to deaths proved by circumstantial evi-
dence.
The Louisiana Revised Statutes provide a further example of the
use of "presumption" to refer to death proved by circumstantial evi-
dence. Louisiana Revised Statutes 40:49 provides that if the body of
one' 40 whose death is presumed to have occurred at a specific date, time
137. 32 La. Ann. 305, 307 (1880). The court does not provide the source of its
quotations.
138. 35 La. Ann. 609, 612-13 (1883).
139. La. Civ. Code art. 934.
140. La. R.S. 40:49(B)(8)(a) (Supp. 1989). The confusing cross references in the statute
give the impression that it applies only to death of a newborn after a live-birth abortion.
Yet this statute has been applied to issue death certificates for anyone whose death is
proved by clear and convincing evidence, even if his body is missing; see, e.g., 20 Op.
Att'y Gen. 374 (1918). It was given the general title, "Preparation and filing of death
and spontaneous fetal death certificate (stillbirth)." However, Section A empowers the
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and place within the state cannot be found, a court can order preparation
of a "presumptive death certificate"'" 1 by the state registrar after a
contradictory hearing against the district attorney of the parish where
death is presumed to have occurred. Sufficient facts must exist to com-
plete the essential parts 142 of the death certificate. The statute does not
delineate the effect of the presumptive death certificate. Because it is
recorded in the vital records registry, 43 it should, like other death
certificates recorded there, function as prima facie proof of the death
of the vanished party.'"4
The presumptive death certificate is not issued on the basis of a
legal presumption, but of a conclusion based on evidence. Clear and
convincing proof of death is required. 4 A reference in the statute to
"funeral director or person acting as such" to prepare and file the certificate of "death
or spontaneous fetal death or stillbirth provided for in R.S. 49:48." That section provides
only for death certificates to be issued on the death of an aborted child who survives
the abortion for a period of time, not for certificates of other forms of death, including
spontaneous fetal death or stillbirth.
The statute thus appears to be confined to death certificates of certain fetuses. Yet it
contains many provisions which are inapplicable to dead fetuses; for example, La. R.S.
40:49(B)(5) (Supp. 1989), which requires a coroner's investigation of cause of death when
death occurs more than ten days after the decedent was last treated by a physician.
Fetuses are not often treated by physicians, but surely the law was not intended to call
for investigation of the cause of death in every miscarriage in the state.
One possibility is that the statute was intended to be general, and that its opening
sentence should read, "The funeral director or person acting as such shall prepare and
file the certificate of death or spontaneous fetal death or stillbirth provided for in R.S.
40:47"-the statute mandating certificates for every death. Two pieces of evidence stand
against this. First, the statute was amended in 1986 to substitute the words "R.S. 40:48"
for "the previous Section." The reference to the abortion statute was made more specific.
Second, the source statute of R.S. 40:49, former R.S. 40:48, contained the same reference
to the death certificates provided for in the "previous section." The previous section,
former R.S. 40:47, concerned the same subject matter as present R.S. 40:48. Yet attorney
general opinions under the former statute dealt with death certificates of others as noted
above. If the statute is intended to fulfill this general role, Section A should be revised
to refer to R.S. 40:47.
141. La. R.S. 40:49B(8)(b) and (c) (Supp. 1989).
142. These are listed in La. R.S. 40:34(2) (Supp. 1989)
143. La. R.S. 40:49B(8)(c) (Supp. 1989).
144. A certificate of death issued by a funeral director within five days of the discovery
of the body, filed with the local registrar of vital records, and forwarded by him to the
state registry after ten days, is prima facie evidence of death. See La. R.S. 40:50(A),
40:47, 40:50(A) and (C) (Supp. 1989); see also La. R.S. 40:42(A) (Supp. 1989): "Except
for delayed or altered certificates, every original certificate on file with the vital records
registry is prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated." See also Succession of Jones,
12 La. Ann. 397, 398 (1857) ("The certificate of the register of Births and Deaths for
the parish of Orleans, introduced without objection in evidence, is a legal document,
creating of itself a prima facie presumption of the death of Harmon Jones.")
145. La. R.S. 40:49B(8)(a) (Supp. 1989).
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article 60 of the absentee title'16 suggests that the proof must be of
circumstances strongly indicative of death.
b. Non-Functional Presumptions of Death from Absence
Article 70, which sets forth the time period that must pass before
the absentee's presumptive heirs can take absolute possession of his
estate, appears to echo the common law presumption of death: "If the
absence has lasted seven years a presumption of death shall follow and
the known heirs of the absentee may petition the court and cause
themselves to be put in absolute possession of the property and estate
of the absentee by the judge.... "147 In the 1985 court of appeal case
Ledet v. State Department of Health and Human Resources,'41 the article
was read as part of an overall scheme by which the title sanctioned a
presumption of death in cases of protracted absence. The court found
"some presumption of death from eight years' absence without com-
munication" as the "implicit foundation" of two additional articles: 49
the repealed article allowing authorization of remarriage of the absentee's
spouse after ten years, and article 53, ordering sale, after ten years'
absence, of the property of an absentee without heirs and payment of
the funds into the state treasury. 50
Article 70 mandates the conclusion that death occurred on the basis
of an absence of seven years. It is difficult, however, to determine what
its drafters meant by "death" in this context, because the effects of
death in Louisiana law do not follow from it. If death were legally
presumed on the basis of seven years of absence, the option in the final
phrase of article 934 could operate,15' and succession proceedings would
take place. In contrast, the presumption of article 70 results in absolute
possession by the presumptive heirs. There would be no need for the
latter if the absent person's succession were opened. In fact, the regime
of the absent person does not allow for the opening of a succession
146. Id.
147. La. Civ. Code art. 70.
148. 465 So. 2d 98, 100 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied 468 So. 2d 1211 (1985).
The plaintiff sought to pursue an action for the wrongful death of his half-sister; under
the Louisiana statute, their absentee mother would have had the exclusive right of action,
had the court not found her presumptively dead. Id. at 99.
149. Id. at 100. At the time of the action, article 70 required a ten-year absence for
putting in absolute possession. See 16 La. Civ. Code at 6 (comp. ed. Supp. 1989).
150. Ledet, 465 So. 2d at 100.
151. La. Civ. Code art. 934, which dates back to the Code of 1808, calls for the
opening of a succession "by presumption of death caused by long absence, in the cases
established by law." No such cases are established by the Louisiana Civil Code, and no
corresponding provision exists in the Code Napoleon.
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'on the basis of absence, but only after a factual determination that
death has taken place. 52
Similarly, the presumption of article 70 fails to provide a time from
which the absent person may be regarded as dead for purposes of life
insurance. In Lord v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,"' the plaintiff argued
that the ten-year prescription on her claim as her absent husband's life
insurance beneficiary had not run; because her husband had disappeared
in 1969, her cause of action had not matured until 1979, when he would
have been presumed dead under the version of article 70 in effect at
that time. 54 The court of appeal upheld the dismissal of her suit on
the ground that "[tihis article obviously is concerned with the rights of
heirs, and not with coverage under life insurance policies."' 5 Remarriage
without divorce is, furthermore, not possible for the absentee's spouse
since the repeal of article 80 in 1938' 56-ten years before the appearance
of the term "presumption of death" in article 70.'17 The death that the
absent person is presumed in that article to have suffered is thus of a
uniquely limited variety.
From 1808 until 1948, the earlier versions of present article 70 did
not employ the term "presumption of death." The provision did not
permit absolute possession until thirty years had passed from the in-
ception of provisional possession or spousal administration, or until one
hundred years from the birth of the absentee.5 8 Yet the Louisiana
152. La. Civ. Code art. 71. See also 3 M. Planiol, supra note 3, § 2463A, at 196:
State of absence does not open the succession. Art. 130 [of the Code Napol6on,
corresponding to art. 71 above] provides expressly that the succession of an
absentee is opened only "on the day when his death is proved." However, the
statute provides in this case for a special devolution, which resembles the opening
of a succession. This devolution benefits the prospective heirs of the absentee,
as well as other persons whose rights are contingent on the absentee's death.
That makes many people say that the absentee is "considered dead" and that
his succession is "tentatively open." This formula is obviously wrong, for the
effects are quite different from those attached to the opening of a succession.
153. 434 So. 2d 1179 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983).
154. Id. at 1182.
155. Id. In contrast, in the common law, "the insurance cases are almost legion and
in them the presumption of death has its most frequent application." Jalet, supra note
1, at 183, n.28.
156. Id. See also Kimball, The Time of Presumed Death in Life Insurance Disap-
pearance Cases, 4 Utah L. Rev. 298, 301 (1955); Roca, When Did Ulysses Die? or
Mysterious Disappearances and Life Insurance, 23 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 172, 176 (1954).
157. See Hebert and Lazarus, The Louisiana Legislation of 1938, 1 La. L. Rev. 80,
83-84 (1938).
158. La. Civ. Code art. 70 (1948). The revision made explicit the powers of absolute
possessors to deal with the property as owners. It also shortened the time period for
going into absolute possession by making the thirty years run from the time of absence,
rather than from the time of provisional possession. The time was further shortened to
ten years in 1978, and then to the present seven in 1986. La. Civ. Code art. 70.
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judiciary repeatedly declared that one hundred years after the birth of
an individual, he was legally presumed to be dead.'59 This presumption
originated in an illogical interpretation of the presumption of continued
life. As applied to absent persons, it was a derogation from the regime
established by the civil code, and it was unnecessary in all its applications.
In an early case the Supreme Court of Louisiana traced what has
been termed the "century rule" of article 70'6 to the principle, present
in French and Spanish law and in French civilian commentary, that an
absent person was "presumed to live one hundred years."' 6' The pre-
sumption had the same Roman heritage as the common law presumption
of continued life.162 The facts of absence plus an age under one hundred
years of one known to have begun life required the legal conclusion
that his life continued, and evidence of death was required to overcome
it.163 The presumption was used to block attempts to avoid the formalities
of the absentee regime by employing succession procedure to transfer
the absentee's property immediately to his presumed heirs. 64 To allow
such a circumvention would defeat the safeguards constructed for the
absent person, as the state supreme court pointed out in Sassman v.
Aime:
If then the plaintiff's father is still alive, or presumed by law
to be so, and the plaintiff herself has established the fact which
creates that presumption in a suit, wherein she claims property,
as his heir, it is impossible she can recover; for she disproves
that which is the basis for her demand. The law has pointed
out a mode, and an easy and a safe one, by which the pre-
sumptive heirs of persons who may have disappeared, can be
159. See infra text accompanying notes 169-79.
160. F. Swaim & K. Lorio, Louisiana Successions and Donations: Materials and Cases
111 (1985).
161. Hayes v. Berwick, 2 Mart. (o.s.) 138, 140-41 (La. 1812).
162. Id. at 141; Eagle v. Emmet, 4 Brad. 117, 119 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1856), and supra
note 19:
163. Hayes indicates that the failure to raise the presumption of continued life owing
to lack of the basic fact of age under one hundred years does not raise a presumption
of death; death must be proved: "Death is never presumed from absence; therefore, he
who claims an estate, on account of a man's death, is always held to prove it." Hayes,
2 Mart. (o.s.), at 141.
164. Id. at 139 (La. 1812) (denying plaintiff's right of succession to land of her
husband, absent for twenty years); see also, Sassman v. Aime, 9 Mart. (o.s.) 257, 262,
264-65 (La. 1821) (presumption of continued life prevented plaintiff from taking title to
property of absent father by succession proceeding); Martinez v. Succession of Vives, 32
La. Ann. 305, 307 (1880) (wife of absentee, judgment creditor of the defendant, could
not revive the judgment in the role of widow); Willett v. Andrews, 51 La. Ann. 486,
494, 25 So. 391, 394 (1899) (plaintiff's petitory action dismissed since vendor could not
have inherited it from absent father, presumed to be still living).
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put in possession of the property they leave behind. This mode
the plaintiff and her co-heirs might easily have pursued. In doing
so, they would have assured their own rights, and preserved
those of the absentee, whose death the law is so far from
presuming, that it watches over and protects his property for a
number of years, in the hope, and expectation that he may
again return. The motives which induced the legislator to thus
guard the estate of absent persons, or of those who may have
disappeared, are obvious, and this court feels that it is important
to society that the law on this subject should be strictly and
rigidly inforced (sic). 65
An article identical to the original article 70 appeared in the Code
Napol6on.' 6 Planiol declared that "this however is not a presumption
of death" and rejected the suggestion that the absentee be considered
dead one hundred years after his birth: "It is a 'sure thing that the
death of the absentee will take place one day or another, if it has not
already occurred, but the date of death will remain unknown and it
will always be impossible to set it.' 67 Reliance on the presumption of
continued life emphasized the continuing concern for the absent person's
interest and resulted in the protection of his estate beyond his probable
existence. As Planiol pointed out, "[t]he ordinary longevity of man
remains well below a century. ' 168
From the presumption that life continued for one hundred years,
Louisiana Supreme Court decisions generated an unnecessary presump-
tion of death after one hundred years of life. The result of the failure
to raise the presumption of continued life should be that the party
relying on the presumption must produce proof of continued life, not
that the contrary of the original presumption is presumed. Yet in the
cases, courts have viewed the lack of the basic fact of age under one
165. Sassman, 9 Mart. (o.s.) at 263-64. Failure to call upon the presumption of
continued life to insure use of the absentee procedure led to the embarrassing situation
in Rachel v. Jones, 34 La. Ann. 108, 110 (1882) (returned absentee would be presumed
to be alive under century rule, were it not for the successful succession proceeding which
her "heirs" had brought).
166. C. Civ. art. 129 (France 1804).
167. 1 M. Planiol, supra note 3, § 634, at 380. Demolombe justifies the sending into
definitive possession a century after the absent person's birth by claiming that "the
presumption of death has arrived, so to speak, at its apogee." C. Demolombe, supra
note 24, § 148. However, he is not speaking of a legal presumption, but of an inference,
which gradually strengthens with the passage of time. For another example of this use
of "presumption" by Demolombe, see infra note 247. Swaim and Lorio, commenting on
succession under the Louisiana regime of absentees, likewise use "presumption of death"
to mean "death . . . established by circumstantial evidence." See F. Swaim & K. Lorio,
supra note 160, at 102.
168. 1 M. Planiol, supra note 3, § 634, at 380.
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hundred years as automatically resulting in a presumption that the party
is dead. For example, in Hooter's Heirs v. Tippet, 69 the court required
those claiming an intestate succession to demonstrate the deaths of known
members of a class that primed their claim. That showing could be
made either "by giving evidence of their death, or by showing that one
hundred years have elapsed since the birth, in which case death is
presumed, and not before." 170 Subsequent cases repeated this language.17'
The courts applied this jurisprudential presumption of death, in
Hooter's Heirs and the cases which followed it, to absentees. 72 In fact,
there was no one else to whom it could apply. If the intervening heirs
were alive, and their whereabouts known, they could have claimed the
succession; if they could have been proved dead, they could not have.
A presumption based on age was needed only to demonstrate their
deaths, because their existence was a matter of uncertainty, undeter-
minable otherwise. But article 77 of the title on absentees has always
expressly excluded such individuals from inheriting: "In case a succession
shall be opened in favor of a person whose existence is not known,
such inheritance shall devolve exclusively on those who would have had
a concurrent right with him to the estate, or on those on whom the
inheritance should have devolved if such person had not existed.' 71
Thus, the presumption was used to derogate from the explicit wording
of article 77.174
The principal characteristic of this presumption of death is that,
when it is not being used in violation of the positive law, it is useless.
If an absent person is under one hundred years old, the regime of
absent persons applies. If he is over one hundred, his presumptive heirs
can pursue succession proceedings by proving his death. The presumption
169. 12 Mart. (o.s.) 390 (La. 1822).
170. Id. at 392.
171. See, e.g., Owens v. Mitchell, 5 Mart. (n.s.) 667, 668 (La. 1827); Martinez v.
Succession of Vives, 32 La. Ann. 305, 307 (1880); Succession of Herdman, 154 La. 477,
479, 97 So. 664, 665 (1923). The Louisiana supreme court attributed this presumption to
article 70; see Martinez, 32 La. Ann. at 307: "That maxim [that death is presumed after
one hundred years since birth, but not before] was then and is now embodied in our
legislation. C.C. 70 (71) .... Cf. F. Swaim & K. Lorio, supra note 160, at 109.
172. Swaim and Lorio argue that a general legal presumption of death cannot apply
to absentees, because if the person is presumed to be legally dead, his existence is no
longer uncertain and the status of absentee is negated. F. Swaim & K. Lorio, supra note
160, at 109-10. However, until the determination that the presumption applies is made,
the missing person's existence would still be questionable.
173. La. Civ. Code art. 77. For the jurisprudence on who inherits in the absentee's
stead, see infra note 392.
174. See, e.g., Owens v. Mitchell, 5 Mart. (n.s.) 667, 668 (La. 1827) (denying sister's
claim to succession for failure to show death of ascendants); Succession of Herdman,
154 La. 477, 479, 97 So. 664, 665 (1923) (denying state's claim to vacant succession for
failure to show death of absent wife and daughters of decedent).
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is thus pointless because it merely mandates the conclusion that would
follow from evidence: that he is dead. 75
An equally unnecessary second application of this presumption of
death emerged. In Succession of Kron,176 at issue was the possible
invalidity, for lack of a certain legal date, of an olographic testament
dated "January 1lth/27." The testator was not an absent person; the
date of his death, January 25, 1927, was certain; yet the challenge to
the will was based on the indeterminacy of the century in which it was
written.' 77 Instead of remanding for evidence of the age of the deceased
or relying on the evidence of when he lived to determine that the will
had been written in 1927, the state supreme court invoked, as a "legal
presumption" and "a maxim consecrated by the best authorities," the
century rule as a presumption of death. 78
The death of a person being presumed, as a matter of law,
after the lapse of one hundred years from the date of his birth,
it may likewise be presumed that he was born not more than
one hundred years previous to the date of his death. If this will
was dated in the month of January, 1827, the testator was more
than one hundred years old when he died .... Applying this
legal presumption, we know therefore as a matter of law, that
this will was not made in the twenty-seventh year of the century
preceding the present one. 179
As in the creation of the presumption of death, a legal convention
was mistaken for a rational premise, and the existence of another pre-
sumption-a presumption of birth-deduced from it. In this case, the
presumption of death has no relevance to absent persons because the
individuals to whom it is applied must be known to be dead in order
175. Evidence that an absent individual would be at least one hundred years old makes
it extremely likely that he is dead. The current average duration of life for an inhabitant
of the U.S. is 74.9 years. Statistical Abstract of the United States 71, table 106 (109th
ed. 1989). Only about 24,000 Americans are older than one hundred. Human Life Span
May Be Nearing Limit, N. 0. Times-Picayune, Dec. 4, 1988, at 2B9.
176. 172 La. 666, 135 So. 19 (1931).
177. Id. at 669, 135 So. 20.
178. Id. Among the "best authorities" cited are article 70, cases which employ the
century rule as a presumption of continued life, and cases which misapply the law and
view absent persons as possible successors; see infra notes 205, 211, 213.
179. Kron, 135 So. at 20; see also, Succession of Caro, 175 La. 402, 403, 143 So.
355, 356 (1932); Succession of Coleman, 177 La. 898, 903-04, 149 So. 513, 514 (1933).
Succession of Boyd, 306 So. 2d 687, 690-91 (La. 1975) pointed out that Kron was actually
a case of permitting extrinsic evidence-the century in which the testator lived-to establish
the certainty of a date which was without any significance or relevance, except to fulfill
the code requirement that the will be dated by the testator. Thus, a baseless presumption
was used to reason nonsensically to an unnecessary one.
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for the court to count backwards for one hundred years. Moreover, its
legal foundation is extremely shaky, for the court's "best authorities"
combined a misconstruction of the law with a derogation from it.
c. The Military Presumption of Death
In one very specialized area of the Louisiana law of absent persons,
the state has adopted a true presumption of death that is a useful
watershed for determining whose interests are to be protected. Under
Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:1441, members of the armed forces who
are missing in action are presumed dead when the armed services accept
such a presumption. 1 °
The decision of the armed service may be based on what would
amount to proof of death in Louisiana. Thus, in Pierce v. Gervais,8 '
the U.S. Army issued a casualty report that stated, "The Adjutant
General finds MSG Donald P. Gervais, to be dead. He was officially
reported as missing in action 1 May 1968, when he was last seen as a
gunner on a military aircraft which was struck by hostile weapons fire,
crashed and burned." 8 2 Section 9:1443 of the Louisiana statute, however,
exempts a litigant relying on the MIA's death from presenting the
evidence examined by the military. Only the fact that the military con-
siders him dead needs to be shown; this can be achieved by means of
a certified copy of an official military certificate or of excerpts from
the MIA's service record indicating that the armed service presumes him
dead. 1"3 Thus, the fact of a military presumption of death gives rise to
a presumption of death under Louisiana law.
Sections 9:1442 and 9:304 set out a mini-regime governing these
missing persons. It differs from that of the civil code because, unlike
the presumption of death in article 70, the military presumption has
the effects of death under Louisiana law. Section 9:1442 deals with the
MIA's property and includes a subsection that preserves his interests
should he return. 84 The presumed deceased's succession may be opened
"in the same manner as the succession of a deceased person, except as
otherwise provided in R.S. 9:1443." '83 The presumption functions as
well in "any other action or proceeding whatever in which the pre-
sumption of his death is an issue. ' '11 6 Section 9:304 permits his spouse
180. La. R.S. 9:1441 (1965).
181. 425 So. 2d 922 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1983).
182. Id. at 924.
183. La. R.S. 9:1443 (1965).
184. La. R.S. 9:1442 (1965).
185. La. R.S. 9:1442A (1965). The final phrase refers to the ability to rely on the
military presumption of death.
186. La. R.S. 9:1443 (1965).
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to remarry without divorce with court authorization; if he is still alive,
his marriage is thereby dissolved. 87
Like the common law presumption of death, the Louisiana MIA
statutes shift property and personal rights without procedural stages
from the person missing and presumed dead to those known to be alive:
his spouse, his heirs, others with rights contingent upon his death, and
third parties who deal with them.' 88 But in their scheme for restitution
to a returning MIA, they imitate the civil law regime of absent persons: 8 9
he is entitled to restoration of his property or to the proceeds of its
sale; he receives the fruits of the property only if he returns before the
expiration of seven years; within that time, he receives a portion that
declines as the length of his absence extends.'19 Though mortgages and
encumbrances remain valid with regard to third parties, those who
thought they were his heirs must repay him the value of these.19' How-
ever, unlike the non-military missing person, the returning MIA's claim
for his property is subject to a liberative prescription of thirty years
from the judgment of possession. 92 Because his claim is one of own-
ership, it should not be subject to liberative prescription, 93 but only to
an acquisitive prescription of thirty years should his heirs fulfill the
requirement of possession. The inconsistency of the rights of the military
absentee with those of other returning absentees appears inequitable
because the succession may be opened without any delay other than
that of the military in making a finding.194
3. The Proposed Presumption of Death
In its revision of the Louisiana regime of absent persons, 95 the
Louisiana State Law Institute has included two proposals that would
resolve the confusion that the term "presumption of death" has created
187. La. R.S. 9:304 (1965).
188. La. R.S. 9:1442A (1965).
189. See infra text accompanying notes 346-49.
190. La. R.S. 9:1442B (1965) and La. Civ. Code art. 68.
191. La. R.S. 9:1442B (1965).
192. Id. See La. Civ. Code art. 73, which places no prescription on the returning
absentee's claim for his own property.
193. See A. Yiannopoulos, supra note 97, § 201, at 541.
194. This delay can be considerable; in Pierce v. Gerrais, 425 So. 2d 922, 924 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1988), the plaintiff's husband was found dead as of July 25, 1978-over
ten years after his plane crashed and burned in Vietnam.
195. Louisiana State Law Institute, Report of the Property Committee: Projet on
Absent Persons, Management of Community Property, Presumption of Death, and Proof
of Existence of Absentee at Time of Alleged Accrual of Rights (Final Draft As Approved
by the Council and the Property Committee) (Aug. 8, 1989) (available from the Louisiana
State Law Institute, Baton Rouge, Louisiana) [hereinafter La. Law Institute, Report of
the Property Committee].
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in Louisiana law. First, the Law Institute suggests inclusion in the articles
on natural and juridical persons the principle that the death of an
individual can be established though his body cannot be found.'96 This
provision, which has parallels in a number of continental civil codes, 197
would remedy an inconsistency in the Louisiana jurisprudence. The late
nineteenth century supreme court case of Martinez v. Succession of Vives
required, when no body could be produced, proof of death that fore-
closed "every other rational conclusion."'' 9 Later decisions forsook this
stringent standard for an unarticulated one that, in some instances,
hardly seemed to reach a preponderance of the evidence. Thus, in
Marrero v. Nelson, the plaintiffs sought to establish the death of Nelson,
who had been absent for twenty years and who had last corresponded
with his family from San Francisco a year before the 1906 earthquake.
That quake and the ensuing fire had destroyed the house where Nelson
had been living; the disaster had produced 1200 unidentified corpses.' 99
Despite the multitude of alternatives to Nelson's death that spring to
mind, it was held to be proved. 200 The proposed article requires that
the individual "[disappear] under such circumstances that his death seems
certain." ' 20 1 The requirement of certainty would re-establish a standard
higher than that adhered to by the Marrero court.20 2
Unfortunately, entitling this article "presumption of death" would
perpetuate the multiple and inaccurate usages of that term. If the facts
that lead to the conclusion of death point so surely in that direction
that it is certain, no presumption mandating this conclusion would be
needed. Moreover, no basic facts giving rise to the presumed fact are
specified. 203 A more appropriate rubric should be substituted.
The recommendation that would heighten the evidentiary require-
ments for proving death accompanies the projet on absent persons,
which suggests adopting a genuine presumption of death. 2° The elements
196. Id. art. 30, at 37.
197. See, e.g., C. Civ. art. 88 (France); Code civil suisse art. 34 (Switzerland); Greek
Civ. Code art. 39.
198. 32 La. Ann. 305, 307 (1880).
199. 166 La. 122, 116 So. 722 (1928).
200. Id.
201. La. Law Institute, Report of the Property Committee, supra note 195, art. 30,
at 37.
202. The Reporter's examples set forth the types of circumstances which would create
certainty: "[T]he body of a miner has not been recovered after an explosion in the mine;
a passenger's body in the mid-air explosion of an airplane has never been found or
identified; three astronauts in a space ship that has been lost in space have not been seen
or heard of." Id. at 36.
203. For differentiation of a legal presumption from a factual inference, see supra
text accompanying notes 34-41.
204. La. Law Institute, Report of the Property Committee, supra note 195, art. 54,
at 23.
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of a presumption are present; the basic facts to be proven are set forth.
Absence, by definition, means that the person whose death is to be
established lacks a representative in the state. His whereabouts are
unknown and cannot be determined after diligent effort. 205 Five years
of absence must be demonstrated for death to be presumed. 206 Unlike
the presumption of death in present article 70, the one proposed would
have the legal effect of death. A judgment declaring death could be
obtained on that basis, 207 thus opening of the succession of the absent
person °.20
The proposed presumption must meet the test of constitutionality
that hampered application of its common law counterpart. The United
States Supreme Court has twice singled out the absentee provisions of
the Louisiana Civil Code as establishing the state's jurisdiction over the
estates of absentees.209 Cunnius suggested that a state law might provide
too brief a period of absence before death was presumed, or inadequate
protection for the interest of the absentee should he return, and thus
violate due process. 210 Neither is the case here. A period shorter than
five years for divesting an absentee of interest in his property was upheld
in Blinn v. Nelson.21I The projet continues the policy of the present
law of absent persons in providing for restitution of. an absent person's
property on his return. 2 2 However, notice to the absent person of the
court action to declare him dead is not included in the projet or in
proposed additions to the statutes governing civil procedure.213 Such an
addition is necessary for the presumption to fulfill the requirements of
due process. 214
Institution of a presumption of death, though a change in Louisiana
law, would comport with modern civilian practice. France, in 1978,
revised its regime of absent persons to include a declaration of absence
205. Id. art. 47, at 15.
206. Id. art. 54, at 23.
207. Id.
208. Id. art. 55, at 24.
209. Scott v. McNeal, 154 U.S. 34, 41-42, 14 S. Ct. 1108, 1111 (1894); Cunnius v.
Reading School District, 198 U.S. 458, 471, 473, 25 S. Ct. 721, 725-26 (1904).
210. Cunnius, 198 U.S. at 477, 25 S. Ct. at 727.
211. 222 U.S. 1, 7, 32 S. Ct. 1, 2 (1911).
212. La. Law Institute, Report of the Property Committee, supra note 195, art. 57,
at 26.
213. Louisiana State Law Institute, Report of the Committee on Civil Procedure:
Curatorship of Absent Persons: Proposed Code of Civil Procedure Articles (Draft as
Approved by the Council) (Feb. 17-18, 1989) (available from the Louisiana State Law
Institute, Baton Rouge, Louisiana) [hereinafter La. Law Institute, Proposed Procedural
Revisions].
214. The notice required must be directed at the absent person. See Scott v. McNeal,
154 U.S. 34, 49-50, 4 S. Ct. 1108, 1114 (1894).
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that is, in effect, a presumption of death. 25 Other civilian countries
likewise have adopted such a presumption. 21 6 The refusal to treat the
absent person as dead sprang from a desire to balance protection of
his interests and protection of interests that depend upon him. But the
system under which Louisiana operates does not achieve this goal.
I. The Structure of the Louisiana Regime of Absent Persons
A. Property Rights.- The Absent Person's Estate
The policy of vigilance on the absent person's behalf, which the
refusal to regard him as dead makes necessary, is evident in the regulation
of the property in the absent person's estate. His rights are initially
guarded by the delay of the three-part plan set forth in the code-
curatorship, provisional possession, and absolute possession-in favor
of his desires for the superintendence of his property. Article 47 of the
Louisiana Civil Code does not permit a curator to be named to administer
the absentee's property if he himself appointed "somebody to take care
of his estate," while article 58 postpones provisional possession if the
absent person has left a power of attorney. 2 7 The mandatary of the
latter article is one type of person appointed to oversee the absentee's
property under article 47. The reasons for delaying curatorship are in
both cases the same: reluctance to interfere in the property rights of
one who may be alive. As Planiol has pointed out, the appointment
indicates that "the interested party himself has anticipated his being
away for a long time," and the appointment makes it unnecessary for
the court to intervene to administer the absent person's property, for
someone is acting for him.21 8 In addition, maintaining the absent person's
appointee in office respects his judgment concerning that property. The
mandatary and the caretaker also appear identical in the effect of
termination of their powers. If the power of attorney expires, or if the
caretaker dies or resigns, the curatorship is inaugurated. 21 9
215. C. Civ. art. 128 (France); B. Teyssi&, I'absence: Loi du 28 d6cembre 1977 § 52,
at 43 (1979).
216. See, e.g., Burgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB) § 3.1 (West Germany); Codice Civile
art. 58 (Italy); Code civil suisse art. 35; Greek Civ. Code art. 40.
217. La. Civ. Code arts. 47, 58.
218. 1 M. Planiol, supra note 3, § 624, at 375. That the representative in article 58
is in the category of caretakers of article 47 is further suggested by the fact that the
Code Napol6on uses the cognates "procureur" and "procuration" in the source articles,
112 and 121; the two are synonyms for "mandatary" (mandataire) and "power of
attorney" (mandat). Vocabulaire Juridique 618-19 (Ire. 6d. 1987).
219. La. Civ. Code arts. 47, 59.
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1. Curatorship
In the absence of exceptional circumstances, 220 three regulatory stages
are required by the Louisiana Civil Code to transfer protection from
the interests of the absentee to those of his probable successors. The
Code Napol6on also contains a tripartite division. 22' But the two took
different approaches to safeguarding the missing person's rights during
the first five years of absence. No formal curatorship existed under the
Code Napol6on; an individual who had ceased to appear was presumed
absent. 222 During this time, the courts would step in upon request, after
a discretionary judicial determination of necessity. 223 As Planiol points
out, necessity was also the measure of the actions that the court could
order taken for the person presumed absent. 224 Two reasons have been
advanced to explain why this ad hoc approach furthered the absent
person's interest. Both Demolombe and Planiol argue for the privacy
it afforded the missing person's "life and ... business. '22 Yet this
privacy would hardly be preserved by a court's repeated intervention
and orders over the course of the five years. 226 A more convincing reason
is historical: before codification, curators were appointed to represent
absent persons in legal actions, but "their interests were too often
compromised by the negligence, if not by the disloyalty of these types
220. The exceptions to the tripartite scheme occur when an absentee either lacks
presumptive heirs, in which case no provisional possession is possible, or disappears under
circumstances suggestive of death, in which case no curatorship is required. See La. Civ.
Code arts. 52, 60.
221. C. Civ. arts. 112-114, 120, 129 (France 1804).
222. Demolombe and Planiol agree that a curator could be appointed, but only in
exigent circumstances; see, C. Demolombe, supra note 24, § 36; 1 M. Planiol, supra note
3, § 623, at 374.
223. C. Civ. art. 115 (France 1804).
224. 1 M. Planiol, supra note 3, § 623, at 374.
225. Id. see also, C. Demolombe, supra note 24, § 31: " 'If there is necessity .....
That is the first condition, without which, in effect, no motive could justify the violation
of the business secrets of a person who may still come back any day."
226. Demolombe vividly portrays the decisions that the court might have to make:
The fields are uncultivated; the leases have expired? One will make, [or] one
will renew the leases. The presumed absent person has formed a company, and
the contract does not give his associate the power to act alone ... ? One will
authorize it. A repair of the buildings is necessary? It will be made. Some
foodstuffs may be lost? One will sell them. A prescription is going to be
completed, an inscription lapse ... ? A debtor becomes insolvent? One will
interrupt the prescription; one will renew the hypothecary inscription; one will
pursue the debtor, etc., etc ....
It may be necessary, for all that, to look into the papers of the one presumed
absent; so it is quite necessary that the tribunal has the right to do so.
C. Demolombe, supra note 24, §§ 34-35.
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of agents. ' 227 As a result, an Ordinance of 1667 prohibited their use. 22
To establish a curator of the absent person's estate would have appeared
to be an expansion of a system that had been rejected as ineffectual
at best and corrupt at worst.
The Code Napol6on did not explicitly prohibit the appointment of
a curator, which could be made if, for example, the. absentee's interests
were at stake in a legal dispute229 or if a series of actions had to be
taken to preserve his estate. 2 0 Such appointments, however, occurred
not as a general rule, but only out of necessity,23 ' and the curator's
acts were limited to those of administration, according to Demolombe. 23 2
a. The Louisiana System
In contrast, the Louisiana Civil Code mandates, without requiring
a showing of necessity or of a lapse of time to attain absentee status,233
the appointment of a curator who is a fiduciary2 4 of the absent person
who left property in the state. Even the interests of an absentee who
left no property behind to be administered are defended by a curator
ad hoc. 233
In its most extensive departure from the French title, the Louisiana
Code imposes procedural requirements on the curator: 2 6 an oath, in-
ventory and appraisal of the property, and security given for its value; 237
227. Id. § 36.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. 1 M. Planiol, supra note 3, § 623, at 374.
231. See supra note 128.
232. C. Demolombe, supra note 24, § 38.
233. La. Civ. Code art. 47. Though no time frame is specified by the article, it does
not apply to one temporarily absent. Whitney Central Trust & Savings Bank v. Alfred,
11 Teiss. 223, 225 (Orleans App. 1914), aff'd, 136 La. 230, 66 So. 855 (1914) (defendant
whose whereabouts were unknown, but who had left on a bridal trip to Denver some
time before, was not an absentee in the sense of article 47).
234. La. R.S. 9:3801(2) (1983).
235. La. Civ. Code art. 56 (1952); repealed by 1960 La. Acts No. 30, § 2. The
provision for a curator ad hoc was moved to the La. Code Civ. P. art. 5091, and
amended to bring it into conformity with constitutional requirements for personal juris-
diction; see infra note 260.
236. Moreau Lislet attributed the curatorship, which also appeared in the Digest of
1808, to Spanish sources and to the treatise of the seventeenth-century French jurist
Domat; see L. Moreau Lislet, Ed., note 6, facing page 15; 1 R. Batiza, The Verbatim
and Almost Verbatim Sources of the Louisiana Civil Codes of 1808, 1825, and 1870:
The Original Texts 8 (1973). However, these sources account for only three articles in
chapter 1 of the title: articles 47, 51 and the now-repealed article 56. The bulk of the
chapter is original to the Louisiana code.
237. La. Civ. Code art. 49.
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a final accounting;23 and a legal mortgage on his immovable property
in favor of the absent person. 23 9 In addition, article 49 appears to require
accounting on demand, distinct from that required by law at the ter-
mination of curatorship. 240 Although the curator receives compensation, 241
he is prevented from completely draining the estate of an absent person
who has no presumptive heirs to demand an end to curatorship. Article
53 requires the curator in such a case to terminate his own position
after ten years by selling the absentee's property and entrusting the
proceeds to the state treasury. 242 These regulations attempt to protect
against the inefficiency and dishonesty that led the French to reject the
curatorship.
Further protection is achieved by narrowly confining the powers of
the curator. The curator represents the absent person's interests in suits; 243
he administers the absentee's property "without having a right to alienate
or mortgage the same, under any pretense whatsoever." ' 24 Thus, his
role is the same as that of the curator appointed in extraordinary
circumstances under the original French system; the difference lies in
the fact that, in Louisiana, such curators represent the legal norm.
During this stage, the goal of both civil law systems is that stated
by Demolombe: "It is not a matter of changing, of innovating, or even
of improving, but solely of conserving and of waiting! ' 245 The order
of selection of a curator, which prefers the spouse over the presumptive
heirs, 246 confirms the policy of maintaining the status quo during the
first period of absence. This order is based on the unprovable supposition
that at that point, the absent person is likely to be alive. 247 He may
238. La. Civ. Code arts. 49, 55. The periodic accounting of Article 54 would operate
to protect the curator rather than the absentee, since it is at the curator's option, and
the judgment of homologation would be prima facie evidence that his accounts are correct.
239. La. Civ. Code arts. 50, 3314.
240. La. Civ. Code art. 49. The article may simply be an identification of those to
whom the final accounting is given-"those who have a right to demand it"-but in that
case, Article 49 overlaps with Article 55.
241. La. Civ. Code art. 50.
242. La. Civ. Code art. 53.
243. La. Civ. Code art. 51; see also La. Civ. Code art. 57 (1825) for a now repealed
provision creating curators ad hoc to defend absentees for whom no curator has been
appointed. For a discussion of the use to which this article was put, see infra note 259.
244. La. Civ. Code art. 50.
245. C. Demolombe, supra note 24, § 34.
246. La. Civ. Code art. 48.
247. Demolombe declares:
It is customary to say that, during the first period, the presumption of life is
that which dominates; that, in the second, the presumption of death begins to
gain the upper hand; and that finally this last presumption prevails and triumphs
completely during the third period.
Well, these different propositions are only true with regard to the rights which
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return at any time and should find his property in the condition that
he left it, insofar as that is possible. Even improvements, if unnecessary,
may be a violation of his property rights. 248 The absentee does profit
through accession of fruits and products to his estate. 24 9 Moreover,
because absence does not end the marriage, no provision permits the
spouse of an absent person in a community property regime to dissolve
the community at this time. Any increase in the community would inure
to the absent person's benefit. 20
already appertained to the absent person at the time of his disappearance or
of his last news; but it would not be necessary to extend them nor to generalize
them.
C. Demolombe, supra note 24, § 11. No legal presumption of death exists in the Code
Napol6on. Id. Demolombe is here using "presumption" in the sense of "presumption of
fact" or "inference." For this use in French law, see Vocabulaire Juridique 607 (Ire 6d.
1987).
The same inference that the passage of time increases the likelihood that the missing
person has died is found in Louisiana cases where no body has been found, but some
indications of death accompany a disappearance. Thus, in Boyd v. New England Mutual
Life Ins. Co., 34 La. Ann. 848, 850 (1882), the Louisiana Supreme Court, affirming the
district court's finding of the death of a man who disappeared from a ship, declared
that "[tihe four years that have rolled by since the date of that decision, serve strongly
to confirm the correctness of that conclusion." In Marrero v. Nelson, 166 La. 122, 116
So. 722 (1928), the absence for more than twenty years of one who had lived in San
Francisco and was last heard from a year before the earthquake of 1906 supported the
probate judge's finding of death. On the other hand, an absence of fifteen months was
not sufficient to support a finding of death, despite a suicide note and witnesses who
had seen the missing person heading toward the river. Levy v. Simon, 152 La. 857, 863,
94 So. 421, 424 (1922).
248. See Smith v. Wilson, 10 La. Ann. 255 (1855). The plaintiff was co-owner in
indivision with Wilson, whose "whereabouts, and even existence, for a long time past,
remains under the evidence, unknown." Id. at 257. He turned their property, which had
been wasteland, into a plantation, and then sued Wilson for the increased value of the
property through a curator ad hoc. The Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed the district
court's rejection of the demand, congratulating the lower court on its protection of the
absent defendant's rights and maintaining Wilson's "right to repudiate such [improvements]
as were unnecessary." Id. at 258.
249. Id. at 257; the fact that Wilson was an absent person did not change his rights
as co-owner. La. Civ. Code arts. 483-516 set forth the owner's rights to accessions to
his property.
250. Formerly, the Louisiana Civil Code community property article 2334 classified
the wife's earnings while living "separate and apart" from her husband as her separate
property, provided her means of earning them was not connected with her husband. This
provision may, in some situations, have protected wives of absentees, but not husbands
of absentees. The article was repealed, along with the entire title, in 1979, when the
revision of the matrimonial regimes law was enacted. See La. Civ. Code art. 2334 (see
also preface to Title VI Matrimonial Regimes in 1972 West comp. ed., Supp. 1989, at
5).
Of course, the continuation of the community also means that the absent person shares
in its losses; see infra, note 314. The spouse of the absentee shares in the risks and
benefits to the community which result from his activities.
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Ideally, under Louisiana's curatorship, the absent person's property
rights are unchanged. His property is subject to oversight, yet it is
safeguarded by the restrictions on the overseer's power and by the
procedural requirements of security and accounting. Thus the property
and privacy interests of the absent person are protected, while the danger
that the French feared in an institutional curatorship is averted.
b. Difficulties and Solutions
Despite its benefits, the curatorship of the absentee in Louisiana
incorporates a theoretical inconsistency and can cause practical diffi-
culties. The theoretical problem is apparent in the article that creates
the office of curator:2 1 it applies to those who simply are not present
within the state, but about whose existence there is no doubt. Initially,
the fact that two concepts rather than one are being dealt with is
acknowledged. Article 47 distinguishes between one who is "absent"
and one who "shall reside out of the State, without having appointed
somebody to take care of his estate .... ',252 Article 52 preserves the
distinction between the "absentee" and a "person residing out of the
State. ' 253 Yet the differentiation disappears: in listing the preferences in
appointing a curator, article 48 terms both types of individuals "ab-
sentees, "254 and the definitional article added to the Louisiana Civil Code
in 1825 likewise compresses the two concepts into one word.255 The
regime of the "curator of the absentee" appears to apply to both. 256
Within one chapter of one title, the redactors attempted to regulate not
only the legally absent, but those who were, in Planiol's words,
'[aibsentees' . . . in the vulgar sense ' 257 of those not present. 258 The
251. La. Civ. Code art. 47.
252. La. Civ. Code art. 47. The digest of 1808 and the 1825 Code employ virtually
identical language, except for the metamorphosis of the "territory" of 1808 into a "state"
by 1825.
253. La. Civ. Code art. 52.
254. La. Civ. Code art. 48.
255. The article reduces the meaning of "absentee", except in the case of heirs, to
one not present in the state:
Absentee-An absentee is a person who has resided in the State, and has
departed without leaving any one to represent him. It means also the person,
who never was domiciliated in the State and resides abroad. In matters of
succession, the heir whose residence is not known is deemed an absentee.
La. Civ. Code art. 3556(3).
256. La. Civ. Code arts. 49-55.
257. 1 M. Planiol, supra note 3, § 612, at 370.
258. Under the new French law of absent persons, certain non-presents now receive
the same treatment as absent persons: those who "by consequence of their remoteness,
find themselves, without wanting to be, without the power to make known their will."
C. Civ. art. 120 (France). These individuals suffer an incapacity in protecting their property,
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disposition of these persons' property raised a legal question different
from that at issue in the case of genuine absentees-the question of
personal jurisdiction.25 9
Using the absentee regime to obtain personal jurisdiction over non-
residents not present in Louisiana was not only inappropriate, but became
outmoded under United States Supreme Court and state supreme court
due process cases. 260 The minimum contacts standard, 26 the advent of
the long-arm statute, 262 and the adoption of a new Code of Civil
Procedure263 offered other solutions to the problem. 26 Article 56 was
repealed in 1960.265 Yet the absentee regime still expresses the substantive
confusion of absentees with those not present by retaining the curatorship
for both. The revision of the Louisiana title concerning absentees pro-
posed by the Louisiana State Law Institute would rid the code of this
anachronism by restricting the curatorship to absent persons26 and de-
leting the definitional article.
267
as does the absentee, and their situation, it has been suggested, may occur more frequently
than absence. See B. Teyssi6, supra note 215, § 10, at 8-9. The Louisiana regime did
not limit the non-present persons to whom its curatorship applied.
259. The principal issue raised by the inclusion of the non-present individual in the
regime of absentees was one of personal jurisdiction. The Code of 1808 had provided
for the appointment of a "proper person to defend the rights of the absentee" who has
no estate to be administered by a curator, but an interest in a lawsuit, by the judge
before whom the suit was pending. La. Civ. Code art. 8 (1808). The state supreme court
rejected efforts to use this article as a means of instituting a personal action against an
absentee; see, e.g., Astor v. Winter, 8 Mart. (o.s.) 171, 205 (1820); Holliday v. McCulloch,
3 Mart. (n.s.) 176, 178 (1824). The 1825 Code revised the article to allow appointment
of a curator ad hoc to defend an unrepresented absentee in personal actions instituted
against him. La. Civ. Code art. 57 (1825). The appointment of a curator ad hoc was
used to obtain personal jurisdiction over nonresidents who were not served without
attachment of any property; see, e.g., Field & Co. v. New Orleans Delta Newspaper Co.,
19 La. Ann. 36, 38 (1867).
260. In the wake of Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714 (1877), the Louisiana Supreme
Court ruled that use of the absentee articles to obtain personal jurisdiction violated due
process; see Laughlin v. Louisiana and New Orleans Ice Co., 35 La. Ann. 1184, 1185-
86 (1883).
261. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S. Ct. 154 (1945).
262. La. R.S. 13:3201 (Supp. 1989).
263. The Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure was adopted by Act No. 15 of 1960,
effective January 1, 1961; it attempted to bring together, in revised form, the rules of
civil procedure contained in the Code of Practice, the Revised Statutes, and the Civil
Code. La. Code. Civ. P. preface (1960).
264. La. Code Civ. P. art. 5091.
265. See supra note 235.
266. La. Law Institute, Report of the Property Committee, supra note 195, art. 47,
at 15.
267. Id. art. 47, comment (e), at 16.
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Curatorship is by law mandatory, 268 yet the jurisprudence indicates
that in some cases no action to establish one was taken though many
years of absence had passed. For example, in Wilson v. Smith, the
absentee had last been heard of in 1832, but it was not until 1855 that
a curator of his property was appointed. 269 In Rachel v. Jones, Rachel
had allegedly left the state in 1853, but her presumptive heirs took no
action until 1879, when, instead of a curatorship, they began succession
proceedings. 20 More recently, in Fried v. Edmiston, no curator was ever
appointed for the property of Edmiston, who had purchased it in 1926
and disappeared many years before the action before the court. A curator
ad hoc represented him at trial. 271 The proposed revision recognizes that
unless someone brings the absence to the attention of the court, it is
unlikely that a curator will be appointed. Therefore, creation of the
position is to be made discretionary upon request by an interested
party. 272
Regardless of whether there is a curator during the first five years
under the present system, the spouse in community of an absent person
cannot terminate the community except through a judgment of separation
or divorce. 273 The former has no way of knowing what measures the
absentee is taking, such as selling property or incurring debts, that may
affect the community, and therefore could never be certain of the extent
of the community's liabilities and assets. Moreover, the absentee's actions
may amount to grounds for a judgment of separation of property-
fraud, fault, neglect, or incompetence 274-without the spouse's knowl-
edge. To allow the spouse to escape this uncertainty, the Law Institute
proposal includes an amendment to the matrimonial regimes law making
absence an additional cause for a judgment of separation of property. 75
The chief practical problem of curatorship under the present regime
is that, in the effort to preserve the status quo out of concern for the
absent person, it takes his separate property, or community property of
which he is the exclusive manager, out of commerce for seven years.
For example, suppose an individual were to purchase a lot in an un-
developed area of New Orleans, and then, after moving abroad, dis-
268. La. Civ. Code art. 47 declares that "the judge . . . shall appoint a curator to
administer the same." (emphasis added).
269. 14 La. Ann. 368, 369-70 (1859).
270. 34 La. Ann. 108, 110 (1882).
271. 40 So. 2d 489, 491-92 (La. App. Orl. 1949).
272. La. Law Institute, Report of the Property Committee, supra note 195, art. 47,
at 15.
273. See La. Civ. Code arts. 155(A), 159.
274. See La. Civ. Code art. 2374.
275. La. Law Institute, Report of the Property Committee, supra note 195, art. 2374,
at 34.
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appear. Her nearest relative is a brother, who has been appointed curator
of her property. The area is developed; property values skyrocket; her
lot is now worth over $11,000. However, the city seeks payment of
$1,600 for paving charges, money that her brother, an unskilled worker
making minimum wage, cannot pay. 276 Under the present system, he
cannot mortgage the property in order to pay the paving charges and
preserve it for his absent sister. Nor can he sell it privately, a move
that would increase his chances of receiving its full value. The prohi-
bitions to protect the absent person's interests result in a situation that
favors only the purchaser at a forced sale. Moreover, because movable
as well as immovable property cannot be alienated, a prescient curator
could not, in late September of 1987, have sold stocks owned by the
absent person.
The solution suggested by the projet is to widen the curator's powers
to include those of mortgage and alienation. 2 7 Only separate property
of the absentee would be under the curator's management. The spouse
who is present now has, as a general rule, management rights over
community property. If concurrence is required, it can be judicially
authorized when a spouse is absent. 27 The projet proposes to maintain
the community property as a unit by allowing court authorization of
the present spouse to manage community property that had been under
the exclusive management of the spouse who has vanished. 279
To counteract the danger that the absent person's property might
be dissipated by the curator, 20 the Louisiana Law Institute has included
safety measures, not only in the substantive provisions, but also in a
proposed revision of the procedural rules on curatorship of absent
persons.28 ' Some are familiar: the requirements of oath, descriptive list,
276. The facts in this hypothetical case are adapted from Pedlahore v. Pedlahore, 151
La. 288, 91 So. 738 (1922).
277. La. Law Institute, Report of the Property Committee, supra note 195, arts. 47,
48, at 15-17.
278. La. Civ. Code arts. 2346, 2355. The projet recommends revision of article 2355
to make it clear that "absence of the other spouse" refers both to those temporarily not
present and to absent persons. La. Law Institute, Report of the Property Committee,
supra note 195, art. 2355, at 31. The absent spouse is protected against fraud or bad
faith in the management of the community by La. Civ. Code art. 2354, which imposes
liability for such conduct on the present spouse who manages the property.
279. La. Law Institute, Report of the Property Committee, supra note 195, art. 2355.1,
at 32.
280. See supra text accompanying notes 227-28, discussing the rejection of curatorship
by the drafters of the Code Napoleon.
281. The report recommends suppressing articles 48-51, 54-55 of the present Civil Code
and dealing with the procedure for curatorship elsewhere. La. Law Institute, Report of
the Property Committee, supra note 195, at 8. See Louisiana State Law Institute, Minutes
of the Meeting of the Council, February 17-18, 1989, at 9 (available from the Louisiana
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security, and a final accounting, 28 2 and that, if there are no presumptive
heirs, the curator must terminate his own position. 283 But changing the
power of the curator also calls for increasing the safeguards. Hence, a
showing of necessity would be a prerequisite for appointing a curator, 214
who must have court approval to "[e]xercise all functions and activities
with respect to the administration and disposition of the absent person's
property.'"285
Because, under the proposed revision, the curator does not merely
maintain the practices of the absentee with respect to his property, but
actively pursues his interests by managing it, the office should be filled
by one whose interests are closest to the absent person's. The proposed
procedural revisions 286 give the spouse who is not judicially separated
from the absent person priority over his other presumptive heirs, who
are then ranked in order of intestate succession rights. 27 However, though
they are still married, the interests of the spouses diverge if one dis-
appears. If the spouse who is present, and not the heir of the absent
person, can be said to have an interest in preserving his separate property,
this interest is short term; in five years, under the proposal for a
declaration of his death and the opening of his succession, the property
will pass to the absent person's heirs. 288 The absent person's interest in
his separate property is long term: should he return at some uncertain
State Law Institute, Baton Rouge, Louisiana) [hereinafter La. Law Institute, Minutes].
For the procedural proposals, see La. Law Institute, Proposed Procedural Revisions, supra
note 213. Though the procedural proposals have received article numbers in draft, the
Committee on Civil Procedure has proposed their inclusion in Title 13 of the Revised
Statutes.
282. La. Law Institute, Proposed Procedural Revisions, supra note 213, arts. 7, 12,
13, at 17, 25-26; Report of the Property Committee, supra note 195, art. 52, at 21.
283. La. Law Institute, Report of the Property Committee, supra note 195, art. 51,
at 20. The time period is shortened to five years. Because the termination takes place
through a declaration of death and opening of the succession, the estate would be a
vacant succession; see La. Civ. Code art. 1095.
284. La. Law Institute, Report of the Property Committee, supra note 195, art. 47,
at 15.
285. La. Law Institute, Proposed Procedural Revisions, supra note 213, art. 16(A),
at 30-31, and art. 17, at 34-35 for the procedure by which approval is secured.
286. It is not clear why the priority in appointment to curatorship is considered a
procedural matter to be relegated to the Revised Statutes. The preference does not raise
a question of how the curator is appointed, but a substantive issue: who is to manage
the absent person's property? Other regimes include preferences among the substantive
provisions in the Civil Code; see, e.g., La. Civ. Code arts. 146 (preference in award of
custody of children pending litigation for separation), 256 (priority in appointment of
tutor of illegitimate child).
287. La. Law Institute, Proposed Procedural Revisions, supra note 213, art. 11, at
24.
288. La. Law Institute, Report of the Property Committee, supra note 195, arts. 54-
55, at 23-24.
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future date, he will enjoy its ownership for the rest of his life. Once
he is discovered to be or declared to be dead, his heirs will likewise
enjoy the property as owners for an indefinite period of time in the
future. Before that time, they have an interest in preserving and max-
imizing its value that corresponds more closely to the absentee's interest
than that of his spouse. The order of appointment should therefore
follow the order of succession; only a spouse who is the presumptive
heir of the separate property should be preferred as curator.
Putting the absentee's assets back in commerce, while solving one
problem, has the potential for creating others, because two people may
be acting independently in the absentee's interest: the curator, and the
absentee himself. In his unknown location, the absentee may be exercising
his powers to alienate and encumber his property. The projet affirms
his continued capacity to do So. 28 9 Any attempt to deprive him of these
property rights would overstep the boundary of constitutionality de-
scribed in Cunnius: it would amount "simply to authorizing the transfer
of the property of the absentee to others.''290 But he and the curator
may engage in incompatible transactions with regard to the same piece
of property. Conflicting claims regarding immovable property would be
resolved by the Louisiana public records doctrine, under which the first
claimant to file his instrument of transfer or mortgage prevails. 291 Those
dealing with the curator are even protected if his curatorship has ter-
minated of right, provided no notice of the termination has been filed
in the curatorship proceeding . 92
Because termination of right may occur by the death or reappearance
of the absent person or by his appointment of a representative in the
state, 293 without notice to the curator, the latter may be in good faith
in these transactions. No provision in the projet protects him against
the claims of the returning absentee or his successors for actions taken
once his authorization has evaporated. The principle of negotiorum
gestio, however, would measure his liability for his actions in the unau-
thorized management of the affairs of another by the standard of a
prudent administrator. 294
289. Id. art. 49, at 18.
290. Cunnius v. Reading School District, 198 U.S. 458, 477, 25 S. Ct. 721, 727 (1905).
291. A. Garro, The Louisiana Public Records Doctrine and The Civil Law Tradition
§ 82 (1989). The doctrine is repeated in La. Law Institute, Report of the Property
Committee, supra note 195, art. 49, at 18. It is unlikely that either the absentee or the
curator would engage in a transaction involving movable property not in his possession.
292. La. Law Institute, Report of the Property Committee, supra note 195, art. 53,
at 22.
293. Id. art. 50, at 19.
294. La. Civ. Code art. 2298. I am indebted to Professor A. N. Yiannopoulos for
this suggestion in a private communication on September 5, 1989.
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The curatorship of the absentee's property under the present Louis-
iana law is antiquated and ignored. Yet in France, where curators as
the norm were originally rejected, their advantages have been recognized.
The revised French title on absence has adopted a system of legal
administration and representation of the absent person during the pre-
sumption of absence 95 that is comparable to curatorship. 296 The legal
administrator is charged with acting "en bon pre de famille"; per-
forming this function may require acts of disposition, made under the
watchful eye of the court. 297 The experience of other civil law jurisdictions
and of Louisiana itself indicates that the Louisiana State Law Institute's
proposed changes will revitalize the office.
2. Provisional Possession
a. The System
The second stage of the Louisiana regime of absentees, provisional
possession, typically occurs after five years of absence. Under the Code
Napol6on, this stage was initiated by a judgment of declaration of
absence, which required an inquiry, public notice, and a delay of one
year before it could be handed down. 29 In Louisiana, a judicial pro-
ceeding is required for the delivery of provisional possession. 29 This
requirement shifts administration of the property that the absent person
has left behind from the curator to those most likely to inherit if the
absent person is dead. These may be the presumptive heirs of an intestate
absentee or the universal heir under a will; others with claims deriving
from the death of the absentee may provisionally exercise their rights.t'
The duty to represent the absentee in lawsuits falls to those in provisional
possession. 10' The change of hands is justified on Demolombe's sliding
scale of the absentee's probable existence.30 2 Those who would inherit
have the greatest interest in the property if the absent person does not
return or proves to be dead, and that outcome appears more likely after
295. C. Civ. arts. 113-115 (France). It has been suggested that the French title is here
recognizing and organizing what was, in fact, the practice under the former version;
Breton, L'absence selon la loi du 28 decembre 1977: Variations sur le th me de l'incertitude,
D.S. Chronique 241, 243 (1978).
296. Teyssi notes that in the Swiss and Italian codes, the administrators with similar
powers are termed curators. B. Teyssi6, supra note 215, § 35, at 28.
297. Id. § 38, at 31; for the delineation of powers in the Code Civil, see C. Civ.
arts. 113, 389-6, 456, 457 (France).
298. C. Civ. arts. 115-119 (France).
299. La. Civ. Code art. 57 (France 1804).
300. La. Civ. Code arts. 57, 62, 63.
301. La. Civ. Code art. 75.
302. See supra note 247.
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five years with no word. But evidence that the absent person is still
alive gives priority to maintaining the status quo: a power of attorney,
which can block curatorship, delays provisional possession an additional
two years.3 °3 Even if it has expired, a curator, rather than the presumptive
heirs, administers the absent person's estate until seven years have passed
since his disappearance. 1 04
Moreover, provisional possession can be blocked altogether in the
case of a married absentee under a community property regime. The
absent person's spouse may continue that regime and "claim and preserve
for himself or herself in preference to any other person, the adminis-
tration of the estate of his or her absent husband or wife, 305 and may
represent the absent person's interests in lawsuits.3 ° This option benefits
the absent person in several ways. First, as Demolombe points out, the
most obvious benefit is that it is "[iln the interest of the absent person
himself ... to concentrate in only one hand the governance of his
fortune. '307 This reasoning may account for the fact that, according to
the express terms of article 64, the spouse administers the whole of the
absent person's estate, not merely the community portion. 08 The re-
quirements of inventory and appraisal protect all of the property ad-
ministered by the spouse.3a 9
Demolombe offers other, more cogent justifications for permitting
the community to continue. Absence alone does not dissolve the mar-
riage; there is no reason to end the community, disrupting, perhaps,
business affairs that depend upon it, when only provisional measures
are still being taken.31 0 Demolombe is thinking in terms of benefit to
the spouse left behind, but the absent person may also benefit from
continuation of the community enterprise. In Pedlahore v. Pedlahoret1
the Supreme Court of Louisiana indicated that the spouse who continues
303. See supra text accompanying note 217.
304. La. Civ. Code art. 59.
305. La. Civ. Code art. 64.
306. La. Civ. Code art. 75.
307. C. Demolombe, supra note 24, § 272.
308. Despite the reference to the "husband or wife who shall have been continued in
the administration of the community" in article 66, article 64 allows the spouse to
administer the entire estate of the absentee. Exercising this option "prevent[s]" provisional
possession, according to the article; the separate property cannot remain to be administered,
or provisional possession would still be possible with respect to it.
309. La. Civ. Code arts. 66, 67. The "legal administration" spoken of in the latter
article and in Article 75 must refer to the administration of the spouse who is present.
The only other possibility would be reference to the curator's administration. Such re-
ferences would be redundant and out of place, since these duties are already incumbent
on the curator under articles 49 and 51.
310. C. Demolombe, supra note 24, at § 272.
311. 151 La. 288, 91 So. 738 (1922).
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the community does so with all the powers granted by the matrimonial
regimes law. Had the husband whose wife and child had been absent
for thirteen years chosen the first alternative available under article 64,
he would have preserved
the same rights and privileges as if the wife were present, in-
cluding the right to administer the community property and to
alienate it if he should deem it proper .... Sirey in his Codes
Annot~s (3d Ed.) vol. 1, p. 87, note 9 says: "The husband
who, in the absence of his wife, has chosen to continue the
community, preserves, after as before the absence, the right to
alienate and mortgage the property of the community." He
quotes in support of this doctrine Persil, Reg. hyp. on article
124 (C.N.) No. 7; Talandier, p. 134; Toullier, vol. 4, p. 360;
Delvincourt, vol. 1, p. 94; Plasman, p. 279; Demolombe, No.
285; Aubrey and Rau, vol. 1, par. 155, note 6; Laurent, No.
206.312
Thus, the continuation of the community includes the right to mortgage
the property, rather than to sell it. If Pedlahore had followed that
course, and the land had increased in value, his missing wife, if she
had returned, would have benefited. 31 3 Although continuing the com-
munity subjects the absent person to the risks3 14 of the regime, it also
makes him a sharer in its rewards: for example, he would be entitled
to a one-half undivided interest in the present spouse's earnings and in
the value of a growing business begun with community funds. 315
The presumptive heirs are said to receive provisional possession of
"the estate which belonged to the absentee at the time of his departure,
or at the time he was heard of last. ' 31 6 The term "estate" includes not
only the things left behind, but also any rights appertaining to them.
3 17
Thus, increases that have accrued by right to the absentee during the
years before provisional possession, such as natural and civil fruits, and
312. Id. at 291-92, 91 So. at 739-40. The court was not done with its authorities at
this point; Proudhon was the single exception to this rule. Id. at 292, 91 So. at 740.
313. The husband in Pedlahore chose, however, to dissolve the community, and to
partition the property under the principles of co-ownership. Id. at 292, 91 So. at 740.
314. See, e.g., La. Civ. Code art. 2346; good faith poor management of the community
property could result in a loss to the absent person.
315. La. Civ. Code arts. 2336, 2338. For past provisions limiting an absent husband's
rights in this respect, see supra note 113.
316. La. Civ. Code art. 57.
317. Black's Law Dictionary 490-91 (5th ed. 1979). The term is used to translate the
French word biens, which includes all the elements of a person's patrimony, including
his property and other rights; see A. Yiannopoulos, supra note 97, § 1, at 1-5; Vocabulaire
Juridique (Ire 6d. 1987), at 100.
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the contributions to the community by the remaining spouse, form part
of this estate.
Despite the strong interest that the likelihood of inheritance gives
provisional possessors in the property, their freedom to deal with it is
almost as circumscribed as the curator's. Although the presumptive heirs
may have been awarded provisional possession immediately after the
disappearance because it occurred in circumstances strongly suggestive
of the absent person's death,31 provisional possession merely shortens
the time that they must wait for absolute possession. It does not give
them greater rights while waiting. Provisional possession is defined as
"but a deposit, which invests those who have obtained it, with the
administration of the estate of the absentee, and for which they remain
accountable to him, in case he reappears or is heard of again." 3 19
Inventory, appraisal, and security are, as under the curatorship, re-
quired.320 Even the spouse who dissolves the community and claims his
share must give security for "such things as may be liable to be re-
stored."'3 2' The provisional possessors cannot alienate or mortgage the
immovables of the absentee. Unlike the curator, they may obtain a
court order to dispose of the movables, but in order to profit the
absentee, not themselves. The purpose behind the sale is
to assure for the absent person the conservation of the same
substance of his belongings, of the business, of the capital; and,
as a consequence, it is suitable, as a general rule, to order the
sale not only of commodities which could not be preserved at
all, but also of movables, which deteriorate with usage and with
just the passage of time, horses, coaches, etc. The provisional
possessors, in effect, are not usufructuaries .... 122
Thus, even if the provisional possessors have a use for these items, they
must instead sell them. The amount obtained must be reinvested in
immovables-which the possessors cannot alienate or mortgage-or safely
at interest for the absent person. 23
Provisions for the returning absent person also safeguard his interest.
The reappearance of the absentee after a judgment of provisional pos-
session causes all its effects to cease;3 24 the former absentee, even if he
318. La. Civ. Code arts. 60-61.
319. La. Civ. Code art. 65.
320. La. Civ. Code arts. 57, 62-67.
321. La. Civ. Code art. 64. For a discussion of the possible meanings of the phrase,
see K. Spaht, Matrimonial Regimes § 7.7 in 16 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise 1989.
322. C. Demolombe, supra note 24, § 95.
323. La. Civ. Code art. 66.
324. La. Civ. Code art. 72.
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is not present,3 25 regains control of his property.3 26 Because the provi-
sional possessors were not, as Demolombe pointed out, usufructuaries,
he also receives a portion, the amount determined by length of absence,
of the annual revenues of his estate. 327
b. Difficulties and Solutions
Provisional possession forces the problems of curatorship to drag
on for two additional years. Some concessions are made to the interests
of presumptive heirs. They may administer the property. They retain
some of the revenues of the estate on the absentee's return. Movables
that may deteriorate can be converted to more lasting investments. But
because the spouse can use article 64 to take on or to continue, if he
was curator, administration of the estate of the absentee, that individual's
separate property may spend two more years in the hands of someone
with no interest in its preservation. Moreover, except for community
property, the absentee's estate is still in limbo. The state supreme court
in Pedlahore remarked, "It is hardly conceivable that our law is pow-
erless to rescue the plaintiff from a situation where he must permit the
property to be sold at public auction and probably sacrificed at a loss
to himself and to the absentee. 3 2 But if he had been neither a spouse
in community nor a co-owner, that result would have been inescapable.
The projet on absent persons of the Louisiana State Law Institute
makes provisional possession unnecessary. After five years of absence-
the usual time for provisional possession to begin-the missing person
would be presumed dead and an interested party could obtain a dec-
laration of death.3 29 Because the declaration would produce the legal
effects of death, the absent person's succession would devolve upon his
heirs. 30 The property that had been managed by the curator for the
absentee would now be managed by the heirs for themselves.
The projet would retain the policy of unity and consistency in the
administration of the community embodied in Article 64 by confining
curatorship to the separate property of the absent person. 3 ' The spouse
325. See F. Swaim & K. Lorio, supra note 160, at 101: "The law carefully uses the
term 'reappear' because it wishes to make clear that what is intended is the reappearance
of the person in the sense that his existence ceases to be questionable. He 'reappears'
into certainty-he is alive. Thus any reliable communication from or about the absent
person would be perfectly sufficient for this purpose. He does not have to show up
physically; he merely has to have his existence become known."
326. La. Civ. Code art. 72.
327. La. Civ. Code art. 68.
328. 151 La. Ann. 288, 290, 91 So. 738, 739 (La. 1922).
329. La. Law Institute, Report of the Property Committee, supra note 195, art. 54,
at 23.
330. Id. art. 55, at 24.
331. Id. art. 48, at 17.
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who is present would still have the option of continuing or terminating
the community during the first five years.332 The proposal that succession
follow curatorship strengthens the reasons for allowing the spouse left
behind to continue the community if he chooses. Despite the fact that
he would not be able to forestall the declaration of death and its
consequences,333 he has a strong interest in the preservation of community
property of his absent spouse. As the surviving spouse, he would have
a usufruct over it if community property is not otherwise disposed of
by testament.33 4 Moreover, the spouse is second in line for succession
to the presumptive decedent's community property.335 Unfortunately, by
placing the spouse still present first in line for appointment as curator,
the proposed procedure would aggravate the negative features of article
64 with respect to separate property by allowing one with no long-term
interest in that property not only to administer, but also to manage
it.336
3. Absolute Possession and the Return of the Living Dead
a. The System
The final stage of the regime, absolute possession, corresponds to
"definitive possession" in the Code Napoleon . 37 Unlike that code and
earlier versions of the Louisiana Civil Code, the language of present
article 70 speaks of a "presumption of death" following from seven
years of absence. 38 The possessors' interests, which have been increasing
steadily, at this point finally outweigh those of the absent person. Once
a judgment of absolute possession is handed down, they may "thereafter
deal with such property as the absolute and unconditional owners. '39
For the first time, no security is required. The expanded rights of the
possessors allow them, at this stage, to mortgage and even to dispose
of the property.
Protections for the absent person remain. The first, which precedes
this stage of the regime, is the lapse of time required for absolute
332. See supra text accompanying notes 305-09.
333. La. Law Institute, Report of the Property Committee, supra note 195, art. 2356,
at 33.
334. La. Civ. Code art. 890.
335. La. Civ. Code art. 889.
336. See supra text accompanying notes 286-89.
337. C. Civ. art. 129 (France 1804).
338. La. Civ. Code art. 70. For the earlier versions, see La. Civ. Code art. 70 and
references thereafter to history and text of former codes (West 1952 and Supp. 1989).
For the meaning of "presumption of death" in this article, see supra text accompanying
notes 151-57.
339. La. Civ. Code art. 70.
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possession to occur. The delay for putting the presumed heirs into
absolute possession has been a formidable safeguard of the absent per-
son's property rights. From 1808 until 1946, echoing the words of the
Code Napol6on, the relevant article had required a lapse of thirty years
from putting into provisional possession, or one hundred years from
the birth of the absentee, before absolute possession could be granted.3"4
For thirty to thirty-seven years from the time of the disappearance, or
until the missing person had reached an age that made his death almost
certain, his property sat awaiting his return. The protection afforded
by this time period made the restitution article virtually superfluous;
Planiol observed that there was no jurisprudence in France dealing with
the issues that arise when an absent person returned after absolute
possession.3 4' No such cases arose in Louisiana.3 42
In a series of amendments to article 70, the legislature has whittled
away at the delay: it became thirty years of absence in 1946, ten years
of absence in 1978, and seven years of absence in 1986. 341 The time
during which the state is willing to allow the absent person's interest
in his estate to dominate has decreased dramatically.
The second protection afforded the absent person contemplates the
termination of absence by return after absolute possession.344 Although
no cases of absentees returning after absolute possession have yet arisen
in Louisiana, they have become more probable. Reappearance after seven
340. C. Civ. art. 129 (France 1804); see supra note 338.
341. 3 M. Planiol, supra note 3, § 2495 (2), at 206. Because provisional possession,
under the Code Napol6on, would not take place until ten years after the disappearance
if the absent person left a power of attorney, Planiol here speaks of an absent person
who returns after forty years as a rarity. See C. Civ. art. 121 (France 1804).
342. Although the plaintiff reappeared after a protracted absence in Rachel v. Jones,
34 La. Ann. 108 (1882), the issue in the case was not restitution to an absentee, but
nullification of a succession proceeding in which she had been represented as dead by
her "heirs." Id. at 110. Rachel had not been absent for even thirty years at the time of
the succession proceeding. Id. The state supreme court observed that, if the plaintiff were
Rachel, her disappearance "indeed appears strange," and "singular," but found her to
be Rachel nonetheless. Id. at 110, 112. These observations, and Rachel's rapid reappearance
once her alleged heirs were put in possession of the property-she filed suit in a little
over one year-suggest that the justices smelled fraud on the part of the overeager heirs-
to-be. Id. at 110.
343. See La. Civ. Code art. 70 and the references thereafter on the history and text
of former articles (West 1952 and Supp. 1989).
344. Absence could also be terminated at any stage of the proceedings by the discovery
that the person thought to be absent is, in fact, dead. Under article 71, during provisional
or absolute possession, the true heirs are substituted for the presumptive heirs when the
date of the absentee's death differing from that of his disappearance has been discovered.
The presumptive heirs may keep the revenues that they have already collected. La. Civ.
Code art. 71. The proposed revision preserves this rule. La. Law Institute, Report of the
Property Committee, supra note 195, art. 56, at 25.
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years' absence has occurred in other states.3 45 The regime provides for
restitution of the estate.3 46 The protection of property interests of the
formerly absent person is, however, minimal. First, under article 68, he
has forfeited the revenues earned by the estate during his absence.3 47
Second, third party purchasers, and those who have acquired rights that
encumber the property, are protected from his claims, an important
feature if the property is to remain in commerce. 48 The absent person
is confined to claims against the absolute possessors.
3 49
b. Difficulties and Solutions
The extent of the returning absentee's claims against those in absolute
possession is open to question. He "recovers his estate, such as it may
happen to be;"350 the latter phrase has been viewed as denying him any
claim against the possessors for diminution in value caused by deteri-
oration of the property. As Planiol points out, "The deliverees were
entitled to consider themselves the definite owners, not responsible to
him." 35' Whether he has an action against the possessors for the dim-
inution in value caused by legal encumbrances is not specified. Discussing
the mandate to restore "the price of such part of it as has been sold, ' 352
Demolombe asks whether the absent person is only entitled to the
particular monies received in payment or whether the possessors become
the absentee's personal debtors from the time that they receive the
345. See, e.g., Martin v. Phillips, 514 So. 2d 338, 339 (Miss. 1987). Martin disappeared
from his home in Grenada County, Mississippi in 1969; his car was found parked near
the Grenada Reservoir spillway. In 1976, his wife had him declared dead, and sold the
340 acres she received as his heir for $95,000. In August, 1983, after over fifteen years
of absence, Martin reappeared in Grenada County and sued for restitution of his property.
The lower courts dismissed the case; the state supreme court remanded the case for
investigation of the possibility of fraud on Martin's part, or detrimental reliance by the
purchasers. Id. at 341.
In 1981, Ed Greer of El Segundo, California vanished, leaving behind a wife, two sons,
a father, and a high-pressure job. After living as a beach bum and then in Houston as
an engineer, he was located by the Federal Bureau of Investigation seven years and one
month after his disappearance. Cult Figure at Hughes: Ed Greer Resurfaces to Some
Relief, Some Regret, L.A. Times, Feb. 3, 1989, part 1, at 1, col. 5.
346. La. Civ. Code art. 73. The grant of owner's rights to the presumptive heirs could
not have impliedly repealed this article without risking unconstitutionality. See Oppenheim,
Recent Developments in Louisiana Succession Law, 24 Tul. L. Rev. 419, 425 (1950).
347. La. Civ. Code art. 68.
348. 3 M. Planiol, supra note 3, § 2495(2), at 206. Cf. C. Demolombe, supra note
24, § 156.
349. La. Civ. Code art. 73.
350. Id.
351. 3 M. Planiol, supra note 3, § 2495(2), at 206. Cf. C. Demolombe, supra note
24, § 165.
352. La. Civ. Code art. 73.
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price.353 Even the restitution of "such property as has been bought with
the proceeds of his estate which may have been sold ' 35 4 raises the
question whether net proceeds or gross proceeds are referred to.
The proposed revision answers some of these questions. It specifies
that the formerly absent person may recover "the diminution of the
value of things that has resulted from their encumbrance." 355 If the rule
were otherwise, the possessors could avoid restitution by mortgaging the
property and consuming the proceeds. Under the projet, when things
have been alienated, the returning absentee will receive only the net
proceeds of the alienation.35 6 But Demolombe's question remains un-
answered: if the heirs consume the price received, or alienate the property
in which they invested it before the absent person reappears, are they
accountable to him for the value of the property sold? To answer no,
as Demolombe does,357 would have the effect of encouraging the absolute
possessors to spend the money on something other than property-
cruises of the Greek Isles, for example, though not the souvenirs-
stripping the returned absentee of all protection while creating a complex
problem of proof as to how the money received as price was used.
Because provisional possession is eliminated by the proposal, it
contains nothing comparable to article 68, under which the possessors
retain all the annual revenues that they have received from the property
if the absentee returns more than seven years after his disappearance.35
Moreover, neither the present code nor the proposed revision explicitly
states whether the possessors have a claim against the absent person for
reimbursement for improvements to the property.359 Thus, these issues
would be decided on the basis of the rules governing accession by good
and bad faith possessors. 60 Commenting on the present regime, both
353. C. Demolombe, supra note 24, § 171.
354. La. Civ. Code art. 73.
355. Id. This provision coincides with the restitution to returning MIA's presumed
dead under Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:1442(B) (1965).
356. La. Law Institute, Report of the Property Committee, supra note 195, art. 57,
at 26. "Proceeds" can include property in which the payment has been invested as well
as the cash received. See Black's Law Dictionary 1084 (5th ed. 1979).
357. C. Demolombe, supra note 24, § 171.
358. La. Civ. Code art. 68. The elimination of this article will necessitate a rewording
of La. R.S. 9:1442(B) (1965), which relies on it.
359. In Smith v. Wilson, 10 La. Ann. 255, 257, the property regime protected the
absent person against expenses for unnecessary improvements, but the Louisiana Supreme
Court there invoked the rules of co-ownership to determine whether to reimburse the
plaintiff, for "the law implied certain mutual rights and duties" as a result of their
relationship. However, the absolute possessors, unlike the co-owner in Smith, do not share
the rights and duties of ownership with the absent person; they succeed him until his
return.
360. Comment (c) of proposed article 57 makes this point. La. Law Institute, Report
of the Property Committee, supra note 195, art. 57, at 26.
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Demolombe and Planiol point out the unjust enrichment that would
result from failing to reimburse the absolute possessors. Demolombe
hypothesized an absolute possessor who received wasteland and has since
made considerable construction on the property. "Do you then give to
the [absent person] who reappears, these buildings, this hotel, which
represents perhaps all the capital of the [absolute possessor]? But that
would be a manifest inequity, which would enrich one at the expense
of the other, without motive and without reason! '3 61 Planiol less emo-
tionally asserts, "[T]he returned absentee is not entitled to be enriched
at [the absolute possessor's] expense. 3 62 Finally, both treatise writers
agree that the article was drafted to protect the interest of the deliverees,
not of the absent person.3 63 To use it to deprive them of reimbursement
would be to misapply it.
These arguments apply with equal force to those who would succeed
to the property of one declared dead. But the general rules of accession
require an act translative of ownership for a possessor to be in good
faith. 364 Without it, they would owe the returning absentee the fruits
and products they had gathered, with only a claim for reimbursement
of expenses for fruits.3 65 Furthermore, the returning owner would have
a right to demand demolition and removal of improvements and damages
for injury resulting therefrom.3 " If the proposed regime is going to rely
on the general rules of accession, it should insure that all presumptive
successors are classified as good faith possessors; but the declaration of
death, which is a judgment,3 67 is an act declarative of rights, rather than
361. C. Demolombe, supra note 24, § 166.
362. 3 M. Planiol, supra note 3, § 2495(2), at 206.
363. C. Demolombe, supra note 24, § 166; 3 M. Planiol, supra note 3, § 2495(2).
Planiol would even require an accounting of the absentee to repay the absolute possessors
for what they have expended on his obligations.
364. For the definition of a possessor in good faith for purposes of accession, see
La. Civ. Code art. 487. Article 487 does not contain the exclusive definition of good
faith in the Civil Code; thus, one who acquires a corporeal moveable by means of transfer
is in good faith unless he knew or should have known that the transferor was not the
owner; La. Civ. Code art. 523. The standard of good faith for purposes of acquisitive
prescription is the reasonable belief, in light of objective considerations, that one is the
owner of the thing he possesses. La. Civ. Code art 3480. However, ownership of and
reimbursement for fruits and products of the property, and improvements to it, raise
issues of rights of accession; without a definition of good faith possession specific to
successors of absent persons, the general law of accession would apply, resulting in the
inequities described by Demolombe and Planiol.
365. See La. Civ. Code arts. 485, 488. Revenues are by definition civil fruits. See La.
Civ. Code art. 551.
366. See La. Civ. Code art. 497.
367. La. Law Institute, Report of the Property Committee, supra note 195, art. 54,
at 23.
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one translative of ownership.3 6 To prevent those who have cared for
the property from being deprived of any compensation for their efforts,
it would be preferable to state explicitly that they are entitled to revenues
and reimbursement.
An additional puzzling feature of the present Louisiana regime re-
mains unsolved by the projet: whether the returning absentee's claims
for restitution are subject to prescription. Because his action is petitory,
it is not subject to liberative prescription.3 69 But it would be without
object if, as a result of acquisitive prescription, the presumptive heirs
acquired ownership. 70 Planiol attributes to these presumptive heirs the
power to prescribe against the absentee: "[Tihey prescribe against him
... . the delay of this prescription being thirty years, because it is not
supported by a title." '3 7' Although the presumptive heirs could not acquire
the entire patrimony372 of the absentee by prescription, nothing bars
them from prescribing with regard to individual assets in the estate. The
policy reasons underlying acquisitive prescription of the property of those
who are present also justify it in the case of absent persons. First, the
possessor, who may have "thirty uninterrupted years of work, activity
and, perhaps, worry," who may be budgeting on resources that include
the long-possessed estate, is favored over the owner "guilty of gross
negligence," whose silence has indicated that he has renounced his
right t73-perhaps, in the case of an absentee, by dying. Second, the
"public interest in assuring the tranquility of possessors" justifies it "in
368. The act described as translative of ownership is usually a juridical act, such as
a sale, an exchange, or a donation. A. Yiannopoulos, supra note 97, § 195, at 525. A
judgment is not translative, but rather declarative of rights, and therefore cannot be such
an act. See La. Civ. Code art. 3483, revision comment (b) (West Supp. 1989). Under
the present regime, succession jurisprudence has not identified death as an act translative
of ownership vis a vis the de cujus because, since he was dead, he could not return and
demand restoration of fruits or deny a claim for reimbursement by his successor. With
regard to third parties, as Yiannopoulos points out, a universal successor's position is
that of his ancestor; he may possess by an act translative of title to his immediate ancestor
from a more distant one. If his ancestor did not possess by such an act, neither does
he. A particular successor would possess by such an act. A. Yiannopoulos, supra note
97, § 195, at 525.
369. See 1 C. Aubry & C. Rau, supra note 115, § 157.616, at 992; C. Demolombe,
supra note 24, § 179; La. Law Institute, Report of the Property Committee, supra note
195, at 7.
370. La. Law Institute, Report of the Property Committee, supra note 195, at 7; cf.
A. Yiannopoulos, supra note 97, § 201, at 541.
371. 1 M. Planiol & G. Ripert, Trait6 pratique, supra note 115, § 63, at 74. Planiol
reaches this conclusion on the basis of article 133 of the Code Napoleon.
372. A patrimony cannot be alienated, and can only be transferred by succession; see
P. Malaurie, Cours de droit civil: les successions, les liberalites (1989), at 14.
373. 22 Baudry-Lacantinerie & Tissier, Trait6 th6orique et pratique de droit civil:
prescription (Louisiana State Law Institute trans. 1972), § 28, at 17-18.
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order to prevent a continuing uncertainty about ownership of things. 3 74
The presumptive heirs' possession is not precarious. They possess neither
with the absentee's permission, nor, at this stage, on his behalf, but
for themselves.3 75 The absolute possessors or successors under the projet
fulfill the requirements for acquisitive prescription: possession as owners
for thirty years.3 76 Thus the absent person's interests not only reach a
nadir at the point of absolute possession, they remain less compelling
than those of the possessors on his return.
The "undead" status of the absent person can give rise to interests
unknown to his presumed successors. Restitution after absolute posses-
sion can also be claimed against absolute possessors by previously un-
known presumptive heirs who are the absentee's descendants. Their claim
does not depend upon their proving the existence or decease of their
ancestor, who remains absent, but on their superior standing as presumed
heirs under succession law.377 Because their action is not petitory, it is
prescriptible; it is subject to a liberative prescription of thirty years
running from the date of absolute possession.3 7 The prescription has
never been relied upon in recorded Louisiana jurisprudence,3 79 possibly
because, in thirty years, the absolute possessors would have acquisitively
prescribed against these individuals. 3s°
The projet on absent persons recommends deleting the article that
provides this prescription.3"" Because succession proceedings would take
the place of absolute possession, the provisions under that regime would
delineate the claims of an unrecognized successor and the prescription
on his action; he would have thirty years from the opening of the
succession to make his claim against his co-heirs or those whose rights
he primes.38 2 Because the interests of unknown descendants of the absent
person are provided for, article 74 is no longer necessary.
The application of the succession regime in this situation, however,
expands the rights of these previously unrecognized presumptive heirs
374. Id. § 29, at 18-19.
375. For the meaning of precarious possession in Louisiana law, see La. Civ. Code
art. 3437.
376. La. Civ. Code arts. 3486, 3488, 3474. Former article 3478 suggested that at one
point, in Louisiana, acquisitive prescription of ten years did not run against absent persons,
and that that exemption had been abrogated. However, no legislation establishing the
exemption exists. See La. Civ. Code art. 3478 (1972).
377. C. Demolombe, supra note 24, at §§ 181, 182.
378. La. Civ. Code art. 74.
379. La. Law Institute, Report of the Property Committee, supra note 195, at 7.
380. "[T]hey [the absolute possessors] prescribe against his children and descendants
who might make themselves known, the time for this prescription being thirty years,
because it does not depend on a title (art. 133)." 1 M. Planiol & G. Ripert, supra note
115, § 63, at 74.
381. La. Law Institute, Report of the Property Committee, supra note 195, at 6-7.
382. La. Civ. Code art. 3502.
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and is inconsistent with the rights of those who are substituted as genuine
heirs if the absence terminates because the actual date of death of the
absent person becomes known. Present Article 74 limits the claims to
descendants, whose rights are no greater than the returning absent per-
son's under Article 73;3s3 therefore, claims against third parties cannot
be asserted. But under the proposed regime, the formerly unknown
presumptive heir could be classified as an unrecognized successor; for
two years after the judgment of possession, he could make a claim
against third parties for his interest in an immovable transferred by the
other heirs by onerous title.3 4
Under the present regime, if the date on which the formerly absent
person actually died comes to light and his presumptive heirs differed
from his genuine ones, the latter have only rights of restoration from
those previously awarded possession.385 The proposed regime likewise
replaces the presumptive successors with the actual ones and limits their
claims in the same way.186 It is anomalous to allow recourse against
third parties to newly found presumptive heirs and not to allow it to
newly recognized genuine heirs of the absent person. It is equally anom-
alous to adopt a procedure for dealing with absence that relies on a
declaration of death and then to limit the application of succession law.
The projet could avoid this inconsistency if, in retaining the possibility
of changing the date of death and installing new successors, it did not
attempt to restrict these successors' rights against third parties.
4. Eventual Rights
a. The System
The regime of absentees in the Louisiana Civil Code treats the
property rights of the absent person at the time of his disappearance
differently from those rights that would have accrued to him had he
not been gone, such as rights of succession. While the property that
the absent person left behind is hedged about with protection for seven
years, his eventual rights are, from the moment of his absence, as
limited as if the possibility of his death were at its height on Demo-
lombe's scale.
So hostile is the law to allowing absent persons to acquire succession
rights during their absence that the presumption of continued life is
383. La. Civ. Code art. 74.
384. La. R.S. 9:5630 (1983 and Supp. 1989).
385. La. Civ. Code art. 71.
386. La. Law Institute, Report of the Property Committee, supra note 195, art. 56,
at 25.
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abrogated by article 76;37 anyone claiming a right accruing to an absent
person must prove that he existed at the time that the right accrued.
In both Dolhonde v. Lemoine s8s and Fields v. McAdams," 9 the wives
as curators of their absent husbands sought to recover on the absentees'
behalf property that would have fallen to them by succession. The success
of the curator in Dolhonde resulted from the presence of a witness who
had seen her husband, who had disappeared from an insane asylum in
1860, in October, 1863-two months after the death of the de cujus,
his uncle. 390 The curator in Fields, in contrast, could not demonstrate
that her husband, who disappeared in 1916, was alive at the time of
his parents' deaths in 1929 and 1934; hence, the succession property
passed to the decedent's grandson.3 9'
If the absentee vanishes before the opening of the succession that
would normally fall to him, he is excluded under article 77.392 Moreover,
although the absentee, should he reappear within thirty years, is entitled
to a share in the inheritance, his interest receives little protection. At
any stage of the absence, those who inherit in his place can take what
would have been his share. No security is required of them, and no
prohibition in the code has ever prevented them from alienating the
property inherited.
On the other hand, on the basis of article 78, which provides for
the returning absentee or his representatives or assigns to claim his
succession rights within a prescriptive period,3 93 Louisiana jurisprudence
had effectively transformed the alternative heirs into provisional pos-
sessors, without power to alienate.394 In Bierhorst v. Kelly, a93 the plaintiff
387. La. Civ. Code art. 76.
388. 32 La. Ann. 251 (1880).
389. 15 So. 2d 246 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1943).
390. Delhonde, 32 La. Ann. at 257.
391. Fields, 15 So. 2d at 248-49.
392. La. Civ. Code art. 77. The wording of the article, which gave the inheritance
to "those who would have had a concurrent right with him to the estate, or ... those
on whom the inheritance should have devolved if such person had not existed," created
confusion as to whether the descendants of the absent person were also precluded from
inheriting as his representatives. For a comprehensive discussion of the problem, see
Comment, Heirs of an Absentee, 4 Tul. L. Rev. 273 (1930). The author there points out
that the state supreme court's dictum favored the right of the absentee's descendants to
represent in Babin v. Phillipon's Executors, 3 La. 374, 377 (1832). When confronted with
the issue in Succession of Williams, 149 La. 197, 88 So. 791 (1921), the court decided
in favor of the absentee's descendants, but erroneously based its conclusion on article
57; see Comment, Heirs of an Absentee, supra at 278-79. See also, Comment, Intestate
Successions, 22 Loy. L. Rev. 798, 814-15 (1976).
393. La. Civ. Code art. 78.
394. Daggett, Successions and Donations, The Work of the Supreme Court for the
1953-54 Term, 15 La. L. Rev. 277, 278 (1955).
395. 225 La. 934, 74 So. 2d 168 (1954).
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had acquired all the rights of her deceased mother's present heirs in
real property in the succession. Two absent brothers, missing since 1919
and 1931, would have been co-heirs. The Supreme Court of Louisiana
reasoned that their right to claim a share upon reappearance indicated
that they had interests in the succession that "were not transmitted (on
the death of decedent) in complete ownership to plaintiff and her two
sisters; and, hence, that plaintiff's title to the property involved herein
is not absolute, unconditional and merchantable.' '396 However, the ex-
clusivity of article 77 indicates that the absentees had no interest in the
property. As Planiol observed, "Those who receive the succession in
lieu of the absentee take it on basis of their own inheritance right, not
as temporary holders of the absentee's estate."3 97 Moreover, as another
commentator observed, "Heirs who choose to relieve themselves of the
duties of ownership and payment of the succession's debts should not
be permitted to exercise rights of inheritance to the injury of others." a9
The state legislature responded in the next year399 by amending articles
78 and 79 to make the right of the present heirs to sell the property
explicit.
Thus the co-heirs of a returning absentee, however brief his dis-
appearance, are under no greater obligation than absolute possessors of
the property he left behind, because their position as owners is analogous.
They need only restore his share of the inheritance or of the net proceeds
of its sale, and after thirty years, even his right to this much has
prescribed. 4°° They retain all the fruits that the property has produced
during his absence.4'
The lesser protection accorded to the absent person's eventual rights
is theoretically and practically justified. These rights did not exist when
he was certainly alive; the rules are not taking away something that was
his.4 2 A major practical consideration stands in the way of allowing
396. Id. at 942, 74 So. 2d at 171.
397. 3 M. Planiol, supra note 3, § 1721, at 510. See also, Succession of Chism, 180
So. 2d 103, 105 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1965) (awarding ownership of estate to second cousin
of decedent, whose half-siblings were absent persons). But see Succession of Butler, 166
La. 224, 229, 117 So. 127, 129 (1928) (placing heirs in absolute possession of decedent's
estate, including share administered by curator for absentee); Succession of Williams, 149
La. 197, 211, 88 So. 791, 795 (1921) (giving children of absentee provisional possession
of latter's interest in his father's estate). Both cases antedate the revision of articles 78
and 79.
398. Note, Sales-Merchantable Title-Absentee's Rights, 30 Tul. L. Rev. 151, 152
(1955).
399. Pascal, Legislation Affecting the Civil Code and Related Subjects, 17 La. L. Rev.
22 (1956).
400. La. Civ. Code art. 78.
401. La. Civ. Code art. 79.
402. See C. Demolombe, note 24, at § 200.
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the absent person to inherit. If time reveals that he had, in fact, died
before the de cujus, the rights of the genuine heirs may have been
hopelessly impaired. A share of the de cujus' estate may have gone to
satisfy claimants against someone who was not its owner. The uncertainty
about his existence at the time of the opening of the succession would
render title to the property received from it unmarketable. It is more
practicable to give the succession and the right to dispose of it to present
heirs, and to repay the absentee, in the unlikely event of his return,
than to impair the merchantability of property and to make restitution
to the real heirs.
b. Difficulties and Solutions
Although the question of who inherits in an absent person's stead
has been clarified by the courts, the code retains its original confusing
language. 403 The projet on absent persons retains the prohibition on
succession rights for those presumed or declared dead; it would, however,
change the law by removing the prohibition on the succession of absent
persons during the first five years of absence.4 At the same time, the
projet retains article 76 of the present absentee regime, which requires
claimants of succession rights by transmission via the absent person's
estate to prove that he was alive at the time of the de cujus' death. 4°5
The retention of this article is inconsistent with the proposal that ab-
sentees inherit. By definition, absence means that whether the missing
person is alive or dead after his disappearance cannot be demonstrated,
unless, as in Dolhonde, the absence is interrupted. Thus his existence
at the time of the de cujus' death is incapable of proof. The proposal
would thus allow a share of the de cujus' estate to pass into the absent
person's, yet prevent its distribution, once his death was declared, to
his successors. Moreover, to transform the rule of article 76 from a
special provision regarding eventual rights of absentees to a general
principle regarding persons, as the projet would do by moving it to title
1 of Book 1, would change the law by abrogating the presumption of
continued life.4 Rights other than succession rights would be affected;
for example, the ownership of the fruits of his property is a right
accruing to the absentee during his absence. His heirs should not be
barred from receiving these because they cannot prove his existence
during that time.
403. Revision of article 77 to eliminate the confusion was suggested sixty years ago,
but no action has been taken. See Comment, supra note 392, at 281.
404. La. Law Institute, Report of the Property Committee, supra note 195, art. 58,
at 27.
405. La. Civ. Code art. 76; La. Law Institute, Report of the Property Committee,
art. 31, at 39.
406. See supra text accompanying notes 161-68.
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Modifying the law to allow the absent person to succeed is consistent
with the fact that he is not regarded as dead and, hence, should not
be deprived of succession rights during this period. France adopted this
change in its revision of the regime of absent persons for the same
reason. 407 But in the Louisiana system, allowing the absent person to
inherit will raise all the doubts about his right to the succession devolving
to him that the present system avoids, 4°s and even increase them. Not
only is there a possibility that the date of his death would be discovered
to precede the de cujus', the court could also set the date at a time
preceding the death of the de cujus. 409 A more practical course would
be to retain the prohibition on his succession and on transmission without
proof of his existence.
5. Personal Rights Part 1: The Brides of the Living Dead
a. The System
The principle characteristic of the Louisiana system for accommo-
dating the personal rights of the absent person to those of other interested
individuals-his spouse and children-is that what little guidance exists
is largely non-functional. Personal rights pertaining to the absent person
are treated very briefly in both the original Louisiana regime and the
Code Napol6on. In each, the marital status of the missing person for-
merly merited one article, but the protected interests differed. The Code
Napol6on protected the deserted spouse who remarried from everyone
but the absent person; only he or one with his power of attorney could
attack a second marriage of his spouse.410 It provides neither a procedure
to be followed to insure a valid marriage nor a lapse of time that must
occur. Article 80 more closely resembles "Enoch Arden" statutes in the
common law states, which in their most protective form conferred validity
on a second marriage of a missing person's spouse after a lapse of
407. The law of 28 December 1977 added a paragraph to Article 725 of the Code
civil, stating that one whose absence is presumed under article 112 can succeed. C. Civ.
art. 725 (France). Teyssi6 observes, "This solution was necessary since the period of the
presumption of absence was accompanied by a presumption of existence." B. Teyssi6,
supra note 215, § 39, at 32-35.
408. See supra note 402 and text following. The French avoid this problem in their
new regime by preventing recourse against third parties who obtain, without fraud, rights
based on the presumption of absence, whatever date of decease is established or judicially
declared. C. Civ. art. 119 (France).
409. La. Law Institute, Report of the Property Committee, supra note 195, arts. 54,
56, at 23, 25.
410. C. Civ. art. 139 (France 1804).
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time.4 1 1 It differed from many other state statutes in requiring a court
order authorizing the remarriage and in allowing absence alone to be
its basis. 41 2
The Louisiana code article appeared to protect the deserted spouse,
who could contract an unassailable second marriage with court author-
ization after ten years of the other party's absence. 413 The absentee's
status as spouse was protected only by the requirement that the deserted
spouse strictly comply with the provisions of the article. 4 4 The advantage
to the absentee was that, should he return, he was equally free to
contract a valid second marriage, though the wording of the code article
implied that he was unable to do so during his absence. 415
b. Difficulties and Solutions
The Louisiana rule, in failing to limit the right to challenge the
validity of the second marriage to the absent person, left his spouse
open to attack from all quarters. For example, in McCaffrey v. Benson,
the second husband of the absentee's wife secured dismissal of her action
for divorce on grounds that no marriage existed between them because
they had waited only three years after her first husband's disappearance
before marrying.416 His exception was sustained, despite his awareness
of her first husband's status and his participation in an attempt to
regularize the union.4 1 7 The children of an attempted second marriage
were likewise at risk. Their inheritance rights from their father and his
relatives could be challenged on the grounds that the presumption that
the husband of the mother is the father of the children born during
the marriage would make them the legitimate offspring of the absent
spouse.
41 1
411. They are so titled after the absentee hero of Tennyson's poem. See, Abrahams,
Two Score and Three of Enoch Arden in New York, 5 J. of Family L. 159 (1965), and
Feit, The Enoch Arden: A Problem in Family Law, 6 Brooklyn L. Rev. 423 (1937).
412. See Hebert and Lazarus, The Louisiana Legislation of 1938, 1 La. L. Rev. 80,
83-84 (1938); see also, McCaffrey v. Benson, 38 La. Ann. 198, 200 (1886) (distinguishing
dissolution of first marriage by advancing circumstantial evidence of death from dissolution
based on absence). See also, Feit, supra note 411, at 425-26 and 442. According to Feit,
in most states, only a belief in the death of the missing spouse and/or a search for him
were required; New York, however, required that the first marriage be dissolved.
413. La. Civ. Code art. 80, repealed by 1938 La. Acts No. 357.
414. McCaffrey, 38 La. Ann. at 199-200 (holding deserted wife's second marriage
invalid for failure to comply with the provisons of Article 80).
415. La. Civ. Code art. 80, repealed by 1938 La. Acts No. 357.
416. McCaffery, 38 La. Ann. at 201-02. The court took note of the "disastrous
results" of a ruling of nullity, but still ruled in the defendant's favor.
417. Id. at 199.
418. In Succession of Mitchell, the inheritance rights of the children of a man who
had married an absentee's spouse were threatened by their aunts. They challenged the
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The repeal of article 80 in 1938 was motivated by the amendment
of Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:301, which allowed divorce when the
two parties had lived separate and apart continuously for at least two
years, a period now reduced to one year.4 1 9 The repeal recognized the
fact that expecting the spouse to wait ten years before remarriage was
unreasonable. But at the time of repeal, the action was criticized because
jurisprudential requirements had been added to 9:301: the separation
had to be voluntary by mutual consent or an abandonment based on
the intolerable incompatibility of the spouses. 420 Thus, the spouse of an
absentee who disappeared after departing involuntarily for military serv-
ice would not have had the option of divorce, but would also have
been without other means of dissolving the marriage.
42
'
Developments in the jurisprudence now permit the spouse of an
absentee to use 9:301 as a means to remarry in these circumstances.
The statute allows divorce even if the separation is voluntary on the
part of only one of the parties. 422 Moreover, even if the separation was
initially involuntary, it can be transformed into voluntary separation by
evidence that one of the parties wishes to end the marriage.4 23 Thus,
one whose husband or wife disappeared during involuntary separation
could commence the year required for the divorce by briefly leaving the
matrimonial domicile and announcing an intent to sever the relationship
with the absent spouse.424 Once the statutory period is fulfilled, the
court is without discretion to deny the divorce.4 25 The practical need
for article 80 has finally passed.
validity of his marriage to the wife of the absentee, and claimed that his children were,
according to the legal presumption of paternity, the legitimate offspring of the absentee.
In order to avoid barring the children from representing their late father in his sister's
succession, the court had to import tacitly the restriction of the Napoleonic code into
Louisiana law; it pronounced the children to be legitimated by the second marriage without
determining whether the marriage itself was valid. 323 So. 2d 451, 454-57 (La. 1975). By
this time, the provision for remarriage on court authorization had been repealed; Mrs.
Connors would have had to seek a divorce from her absentee husband before marrying
Mr. Morrison.
419. La. R.S. 9:301 (Supp. 1989).
420. Hebert and Lazarus, supra note 412, at 84.
421. Id. At the time, La. R.S. 9:304 did not exist. Moreover, that statute only permits
court-authorized remarriage if the military absentee is missing in action and presumed
dead by the armed forces.
422. Otis v. Bahan, 209 La. 1082, 1088, 26 So. 2d 146, 148 (La. 1946).
423. Id, 26 So. 2d at 148. The parties were physically separated when the husband
was inducted into the U.S. Navy; separation for the purpose of divorce did not begin
until the wife left the matrimonial domicile. However, the divorce action failed because
the statutory two years had not passed. Id. at 1091-92, 26 So. 2d at 149.
424. Cf. Adams v. Adams, 408 So. 2d 1322, 1327-28 (La. 1982) (assertions that she
intended to separate permanently from her husband by wife of man committed to mental
institution were evidence enough to commence the separation period).
425. Otis, 209 La. at 1088, 26 So. 2d at 148.
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Whether Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:301 is a theoretically appro-
priate substitute is questionable. The spouse left behind does not nec-
essarily wish to end his first marriage. He has lost his spouse. His
situation is analogous to that of a widower who wishes to remarry, not
to that of one who actively wants to end an ongoing relationship. The
court authorization of remarriage on grounds of absence was a more
fitting means of dissolution. Under the proposed revision, which provides
for a presumption and declaration of death, the deserted spouse would
be treated in the appropriate fashion as a widow five years after the
disappearance. However, four points are left unclear. First, if the spouse
of an absentee remarries once the presumption of death attaches, without
relying on a judicial proceeding declaring death, is the second marriage
valid? 426 States with a presumption of death but no requirement of
judicial procedure have required, in addition to absence for the statutory
period, proof that the remaining spouse believed that the absent person
was dead. 427 Second, is the right to challenge the validity of the second
marriage restricted? Third, if the second marriage is invalid, does the
existence of the presumption of death give the remarried spouse the
protection of the good faith putative spouse?42 Finally, an Enoch Arden
provision is required to clarify the status of the remarried spouse if the
absent person returns alive, or if a new date after that of the marriage
is established for his death.429
6. Personal Rights, Part 2: Children
a. The System
Of the five articles providing for the children of an absentee, only
two are functional. Article 84 remains relevant, although it literally
426. The McCaffrey court would have presumed the validity of the plaintiff's second
marriage had her first husband been absent for the statutory period when it took place,
but the court implied that this presumption would have been rebuttable. Mrs. McCaffrey
did not, however, have a presumption of her husband's death to justify her actions. 38
La. Ann. at 200.
427. Feit, supra note 411, at 425-26.
428. For a discussion of the role of good faith in the putative marriage doctrine, see
Blakesley, The Putative Marriage Doctrine, 60 Tul. L. Rev. 2, 18-23 (1985).
429. La. R.S. 9:304 (1965) contains an "Enoch Arden" proviso for remarried spouses
of MIA's presumed dead. France has adopted such an article in its revision of the title
on absent persons: "The marriage of the absent person remains dissolved, even if the
judgment declaring the absence has been annulled." C. Civ. art. 132.
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protects only children of absent fathers. It calls for a "provisional
tutor ' 430 to be appointed in two situations: if the wife of the absentee
is dead when the disappearance occurs or if the wife dies after it occurs. 4 1
A similar article appears in the Code Napol6on, 43 but in two ways the
Louisiana regime intensifies the protection of the interests of the children
of the absent person. The tutor is to be selected according to the title
on tutorship.433 The drafters probably intended legal tutorship a.4 4 At the
time that the absentee regime originated, legal tutorship would have
resulted in the appointment of the nearest ascendant in the direct line
as tutor of the minor. 435 The Code Napol6on entrusted the children to
the same individuals, but did so by order of the family meeting, not
through tutorship. 436 As Demolombe points out, "[A]s a consequence,
there is neither the nomination of an undertutor nor the legal mortgage
on the immovables of the ascendant" that characterizes the legal tu-
torship of ascendants. 437 By requiring tutorship, the Louisiana regime
insures that its safeguards will be extended to the children of absent
fathers.
Additionally, the French regime required a delay of six months after
the disappearance of the father, the mother either having already died
430. The use of the word "provisional" in this context is confusing. It does not
appear in the tutorship articles; although the term appears in the Louisiana Code of Civil
Procedure, it refers to temporary tutors appointed pending a permanent appointment, or
successors appointed in cases of vacancy. See La. Code Civ. P. art. 4070 and comments
thereto.
431. La. Civ. Code art. 84.
432. C. Civ. art. 142 (France 1804).
433. Article 84 declares that the tutor is to be appointed "in the manner herein
directed." The only directions given in the chapter are those in the preceding article,
calling for appointment of a provisional tutor "in the manner prescribed in the title: Of
Minors, their Tutorship and Emancipation." La. Civ. Code art. 83. If the absent father
is still alive, he is of right the natural tutor of his children, but he is not present to
qualify for the office, or even to indicate that he is alive and entitled to it. See La. Civ.
Code arts. 250, 248. Tutorship by testament of the dying mother would not have been
appropriate; the regime of tutorship gave this right of appointment to the parent dying
last. La. Civ. Code art. 257. The nature of absence makes it impossible to know the
order of the parents' death.
434. Demolombe, while denying that any tutorship is established by the corresponding
French article, indicates that other commentators believed legal tutorship to have been
intended. C. Demolombe, supra note 24, § 321.
435. La. Civ. Code art. 263 (1972). The article has since been revised to allow a
choice by the judge among ascendants in the direct line, collaterals by blood within the
third degree, and a surviving stepparent, based on the best interests of the children. See
La. Civ. Code art. 263.
436. See supra note 176.
437. C. Demolombe, supra note 24, § 321.
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or dying during that period,438 before the ascendants could be given the
care of the children. Demolombe attributes the delay to concern for the
interests of the absent father; it is "based on the danger . . . in delving
too soon into the affairs of the one presumed absent, whom one can
still hope to see reappear at any moment. ' 439 The Louisiana regime
completely disregards this interest of the absent father in favor of
providing guardians immediately for the children he left behind.
Article 85 applies to all absent parents, not merely fathers. When
a remarried individual vanishes leaving children of a previous marriage,
provisional tutorship again is called for.A This tutorship would normally
not apply if the remarriage was subsequent to divorce, and the other
parent were still alive; he would be the tutor of his children. 44' However,
if the disappearing spouse were a remarried widow, the stepparent can
only obtain tutorship if it appears to be in the best interests of the
children." 2 The basis of the article is, as in article 82, the suspicion
that the second spouse "is not, h6Las! always paternal!" 443 in guarding
the interests of the children of his spouse's previous marriage.
b. Difficulties and Solutions
Article 81 indicates the lopsided view that makes much of this section
of the code unworkable; it empowers the mother of children whose
father has disappeared to "exercise all the rights of her husband with
respect to their education, and the administration of their estate." 444
The article parrots the Code Napol6on. 445 To the extent that it implies
that the mother is deprived of these powers while the father is present,
it may be unconstitutional.4" No important state objective appears to
be served. It is also, in Louisiana, unnecessary. Although, according to
the original French code, the father was the sole repository of parental
authority,' 4 7 in Louisiana the parents always shared this dominion. Une-
438. Id. § 324. As Demolombe indicates, if the mother survived after the father
vanished by more than six months, the ascendants would not be given the care of her
children.
439. Id. § 320.
440. La. Civ. Code art. 85.
441. La. Civ. Code art. 250.
442. La. Civ. Code art. 263.
443. C. Demolombe, supra note 24, § 326.
444. La Civ. Code art. 81.
445. C. Civ. art. 141 (France 1804).
446. The equal protection clause of the constitution of the United States has been
interpreted to require an important governmental objective to which a gender classification
is closely related for it to withstand constitutional challenge. See Craig v. Boren, 429
U.S. 190, 97 S. Ct. 1161 (1976).
447. See, e.g., C. Civ. art. 373 (France 1804), providing that the father alone exercises
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mancipated minors are under the authority of both parents."4 Although
in cases of disagreement between the parents, "the authority of the
father prevails," if he is missing it is impossible for such disagreement
to occur." 9 The administration of the minor's estate, ordinarily in the
father's hands while the parents are married, is in the mother's hands
if the father is absent.450 Although the civil code provides that the
parents together represent their children in lawsuits and receive donations
for them,451 the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure now indicates that
these powers reside in the mother in the absence of the father.4 52 Its
predecessor, the Code of Practice, did not explicitly treat the represen-
tation of minors when their situation did not require a tutor; 453 the
Louisiana Supreme Court reasoned from Civil Code article 235 that
"[t]hat authority is conferred upon the father and mother jointly when
they are both present; and it stands to reason that the mother should
be authorized to act separately and alone in case the 'father has dis-
appeared. ' '45 4
The mother who remarries can continue to wield these powers only
with the consent of a family meeting composed of the father's relations
and friends; without it, a "provisional tutor" is appointed in her stead. 455
Articles 82 and 83, which place these restrictions on the mother, have
no source in the Code Napol6on. The drafters of the Louisiana Civil
Code of 1825 justified them as follows in its projet: "The utility of
these additional dispositions need not be explained.' '456 Since the series
of Married Women's Emancipation Acts went into effect, an explanation
is in order. Before the passage of those acts between 1916 and 1928,
457
the paternal authority described in article 372 of the same code during marriage; and at
article 389, providing that the father is the administrator of the property of minor children
during marriage.
448. La. Civ. Code art. 216.
449. Id.
450. La. Civ. Code art. 221. The Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure, in its article
providing for the administration of the estate of a minor, does not consider this eventuality,
and so omits mention of the mother's power. La. Code Civ. P. art. 4501.
451. La. Civ. Code art. 235.
452. See La. Code Civ. P. arts. 683, 732 and 4502.
453. Code of Practice in Civil Cases for the State of Louisiana art. 115 (New Orleans
1839).
454. Williams v. Pope Mfg. Co., 52 La. Ann. 1417, 1444, 27 So. 851, 862 (1900),
quoting La. Civ. Code art. 81. Article 81 was relied on by the plaintiff. Id. at 1443, 27
So. at 862. It was unnecessary for the court's holding, which is based on article 235.
See also Payton v. Ideal Savings and Homestead Ass'n, 160 So. 648, 649 (La. App. Orl.
1935) (relying on Williams to find that mother of minor had capacity to bring personal
injury suit where father had disappeared).
455. La. Civ. Code arts. 82, 83.
456. A Republication of the Projet of the Civil Code of Louisiana of 1825, at 7
(Louisiana Legal Archives vol. 1, 1937).
457. La. R.S. 9:101-105 (1965).
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the absentee's wife who remarried would have been subject not only to
the great influence, but also to the legal control of her new husband.
He could not be expected as a matter of course to share her feelings
for the children of her previous marriage; hence, the protection of an
evaluation by a family meeting and the appointment of a tutor if
necessary was devised. Articles 82 and 83 are not only likely to prove
unconstitutional, 458 they are obsolete, for the emancipation acts ended
their policy rationale. In addition, family meetings to determine the
appointment of a tutor have been dispensed with. 45 9
Except in article 85, in protecting the interests of children left behind,
the Louisiana title on absentees, for historical reasons, 460 focuses on
children of absent fathers. Despite the strength of the children's interests,
gaps exist that must be filled by analogy. The children of an absent
mother may lose their father, or both parents may disappear. Demolombe
believed that the rules governing the case when the wife is dead and
the husband an absentee cover these situations as well. In the first
instance, "reason and principles would not permit, in effect, any dif-
ference between these two cases."'6 In the second instance, the rules
apply in default of any other provision for the care of the children.4 62
If the projet on absent persons were adopted, once the absent person
is declared dead, the title on tutorship would govern.43 But before such
a declaration, the issue of who shall be tutor is left open, along with
the issue whether a tutor is required should the absent person return.
The projet retains article 84, but relegates it to the revised statutes, and
deletes the remainder of the articles in this chapter. Articles 84 and 85
should be revised and expanded to fill the gaps that now require reliance
on analogy.
CONCLUSION
The intricate shield that Louisiana raised to protect the rights of
the absent person elicited the admiration of the United States Supreme
Court in the late nineteenth century, when it confronted an alternative
that did not provide for those rights. But it was not the presumption
of death itself, but the lack of a regime to safeguard the one presumed
dead that met with the disapproval of the Court. The usefulness of this
presumption has led to its incorporation in modern civilian systems. The
revision of the regime of absent persons proposed by the Louisiana
458. See supra note 446.
459. La. R.S. 9:602 (1965).
460. See supra text accompanying notes 445 and 447.
461. C. Demolombe, supra note 24, § 328.
462. Id. § 329.
463. See La. Civ. Code art. 250.
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State Law Institute would follow suit. Yet, as Mary Ann Glendon
observed, "In using comparative law as an aid to law reform, it is even
sometimes hard to tell whether a particular foreign example should be
regarded as a beacon or as a warning." 4 4 The presumption of death
serves as both. It carries with it two dangers that have manifested
themselves in common law. The first is to the constitutionality of the
regime; but the rules there are simple, and errors can easily be remedied.
The second is the threat that the legal presumption will accumulate so
many requirements to raise it that it will be transformed into an inference
of fact. A factual determination of the death of an absent person is a
contradiction in terms; that transformation would prevent the presump-
tion from being raised and the regime from being useful.
On the other hand, incorporation of the presumption makes the
regime that accompanies it less cumbersome, because once the absent
person is presumed dead, his relations with those known to be alive
can be defined by other regimes, such as succession law. The elaborate
nature of the current Louisiana regime has proved to be self-defeating.
The jurisprudence reveals that the regime of absence has never been
fully understood or consistently applied in Louisiana; its inadequacies
were extensively explored and remedied only in the realm of eventual
rights. The regime of absence can obstruct interests it was designed to
protect, because both the absent person and his presumptive heirs may
be the losers if his property is out of commerce. And its protection of
the absent person's family, always scant, is now virtually meaningless.
Although the proposed revision does not answer every question raised
by absence, it does attempt to use a presumption of death as part of
a viable regime to govern the rights of those affected by absence.
Author's Postscript: In the 1990 legislative session, the Louisiana State
Legislature adopted La. Act No. 989, containing a revision of Book I,
Title III of the Louisiana Civil Code and a revised procedure for the
curatorship of absent persons. Governor Roemer signed the act on July
26, 1990; it takes effect on January 1, 1991. 1990 La. Acts No. 989
contained, unchanged, the revision proposed by the Louisiana State Law
Institute. The procedural revisions, on the recommendation of the In-
stitute, will be incorporated into the Revised Statutes as sections 13:3421-
3445. The weaknesses of that proposal remain, but in the adoption of
the presumption of death and the clarification of procedure, the new
title and statutes offer the hope that the inconsistencies which charac-
terized the Louisiana law of absent persons will now end.
464. Glendon, Irish Family Law in Comparative Perspective: Can There Be Comparative
Family Law? 9 Dublin U.L.J. 1, 2 (1987).
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